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I. INTRODUCTION
In April 1990 in Yellow Freight System, Inc. v. Donnelly,1 the
United States Supreme Court resolved a split among the circuit courts2
and held that state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over
Title VII claims." This decision strengthens a presumption that state
courts, as a whole, can be equal to their federal counterparts in adjudi-
cating federal employment discrimination claims.4 It also further com-
plicates the process of forum selection for employment discrimination
litigants. Because plaintiffs now may present Title VII claims in state
court, the doctrine of res judicata will bar any subsequent presentation
of Title VII claims in federal court that the plaintiff could have raised
in a prior state court action.5 Plaintiffs who wish to pursue related state
claims in state court without risking removal may have to abandon
their Title VII claims to protect their choice of forum.' Consequently,
the informed use of the forum selection process in making that choice is
increasingly important. Now more than ever, litigants need an analyti-
cal framework to guide them in the forum selection process.
Scholars and commentators consistently have debated the proper
role of the state and federal courts in the adjudication of federal
claims.1 One can trace the origins of this debate to the Framers of the
1. 110 S. Ct. 1566 (1990).
2. For circuit courts holding that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over Title VII
claims, see cases cited infra note 21. In Donnelly v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 874 F.2d 402 (7th
Cir. 1989), af'd, 110 S. Ct. 1566 (1990), the Seventh Circuit held that state courts have concurrent
jurisdiction over Title VII claims, thus creating a split among the circuits. For a discussion of the
two positions, see infra subparts II(A) & (B).
3. Yellow Freight, 110 S. Ct. at 1570. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits
discrimination in employment on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988).
4. See Yellow Freight, 110 S. Ct. at 1570 (acknowledging a "presumption that state courts
are just as able as federal courts to adjudicate Title VII claims").
5. Even before the Yellow Freight decision, plaintiffs were not necessarily free to bring a
Title VII claim in federal court subsequent to state court litigation of related claims. In Kremer v.
Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982), the Court held that state court decisions rejecting
similar state employment discrimination claims may preclude subsequently raised Title VII claims.
Id. at 484-85. Nevertheless, Kremer did not bar all subsequently raised Title VII claims. To the
extent that a Title VII claim raised issues not covered by state law and, thus, could not have been
litigated in state court, the claim was not precluded. See Catania, Access to the Federal Courts for
Title VII Claimants in the Post-Kremer Era: Keeping the Doors Open, Loy. U. CHL. L.J. 209, 239
(1985) (noting that "[p]reclusion should not apply with respect to those Title VH matters that are
broader than the rights under state law and which could not have been raised in the state
proceeding").
6. Suits in which plaintiffs raise federal claims generally are subject to removal to federal
court by defendants under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1988).
7. See, e.g., Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425 (1987); Bator, The
State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 Wh. & MARY L. Rav. 605 (1981); Fallon,
The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. Rav. 1141 (1988); Gunther, Congressional Power
to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L.
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Constitution8 In recent years this debate often has focused on the issue
of parity: whether or not the state courts, as a whole, provide adequate
and trustworthy forums for litigants seeking protection of federal
rights.' The parity debate raises issues significant to the determination
of the proper roles of the federal and state courts in enforcing federal
rights. Although no consensus has emerged, 10 the continuing debate is
likely to influence the allocation of judicial resources by judges and leg-
REv. 895 (1984); Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An
Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARv. L. REv. 1362 (1953); Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the Dis-
trict Courts, 53 COLuM. L. REV. 157 (1953); Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 Hv. L. REV. 1105
(1977); Redish & Muench, Adjudication of Federal Causes of Action in State Court, 76 MICH. L.
REV. 311 (1976); Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1001 (1965).
8. Solimine & Walker, Constitutional Litigation in Federal and State Courts: An Empirical
Analysis of Judicial Parity, 10 HASTMGS CONST. L.Q. 213, 215-16 (1983). At the Constitutional
Convention, some of the Framers argued that state courts could not be trusted to provide adequate
protection of federal interests and that the Constitution should provide for the creation of lower
federal courts. Others contended that lower federal courts would duplicate the state courts unnec-
essarily and that Supreme Court review of state court decisions would protect federal interests
sufficiently. James Madison and James Wilson proposed a compromise-the Madisonian Compro-
mise-suggesting the immediate creation of the Supreme Court and a grant of discretion to Con-
gress to create lower federal courts. The Framers incorporated this compromise in article IH, § 1 of
the Constitution. Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary,
36 UCLA L. REv. 233, 239-40 (1988); Solimine & Walker, supra, at 215-16.
9. Although not the first to suggest that federal courts provide litigants an inherently better
forum in which to present federal claims than state courts, Professor Burt Neuborne is primarily
responsible for framing the modem parity debate. See Neuborne, supra note 7. For other impor-
tant contributions to the parity debate, see Bator, supra note 7 (arguing that state courts are as
capable as federal courts of protecting federal rights); Chemerinsky, Federal Courts, State Courts,
and the Constitution: A Rejoinder to Professor Redish, 36 UCLA L. Rv. 369 (1988) (arguing that
the parity debate is unresolvable and suggesting that plaintiffs be allowed to select the forum in
which to present constitutional and constitutionally based claims); Chemerinsky, supra note 8
(same); Redish, Judicial Parity, Litigant Choice, and Democratic Theory: A Comment on Federal
Jurisdiction and Constitutional Rights, 36 UCLA L. REv. 329 (1988) (arguing that federal courts
remain an inherently superior forum for the enforcement of federal rights); Solimine & Walker,
State Court Protection of Federal Constitutional Rights, 12 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 127 (1989)
(offering empirical data to support the argument that parity exists between state and federal
courts); and Solimine & Walker, supra note 8 (same).
The modem parity debate questions whether federal courts are an inherently superior forum
for the protection of federal constitutional and constitutionally created rights. Chemerinsky, supra
note 8, at 235. Some federal discrimination law falls directly into this category. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981, 1983 (1988). The remainder of federal employment discrimination law, most notably Title
VII, technically falls into the category of statutorily created rights, but may be viewed as a logical
extension of constitutionally created rights. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was largely an effort to
correct the inability or unwillingness of the states to comply with the spirit if not the letter of the
fourteenth amendment. Note, Title VII and State Courts: Divining Implicit Congressional Intent
with Regard to State Court Jurisdiction, 28 B.C.L. REv. 299, 304 (1987) (noting that Congress
enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964 "in response to the nationwide persistence of racial and other
discrimination against minority groups and the inadequacy of state efforts to combat discrimina-
tion"). Thus, many of the concerns expressed in the parity debate validly apply to the body of
federal employment discrimination law as well.
10. Chemerinsky, supra note 8, at 236, 255-56 (arguing that the parity debate is
unresolvable).
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islators alike.
The Yellow Freight decision forces employment discrimination liti-
gants and their attorneys engaging in the process of forum selection to
confront many of the same issues raised by the parity debate. These
issues, however, have a different significance for individual litigants
confronted with a choice between state and federal forums. For liti-
gants, the important inquiry is not whether state courts as a whole are
as capable as their federal counterparts in protecting federal rights, but
whether, in a given case, a particular state court or a particular federal
court is more amenable to the claims or defenses litigants may raise.
Thus, to be of value to individuals in developing a framework for forum
selection, the parity debate must move to another level. Although the
central question remains whether one forum is better than another, a
pragmatic approach to forum selection requires an individualization of
the parity debate.
The process of individualization should begin by framing the de-
bate within the specific context in which the evaluation of and selection
between forums will occur. Litigants must consider the dynamics of the
context and also identify and consider its variable factors. These factors
may include the breadth of rights and remedies offered under state and
federal law, the degree to which one or the other may dominate the
case, the comparative receptivity of state and federal courts to the is-
sues raised, and the procedural advantages and disadvantages that may
accompany the choice of forum. In the context of employment discrimi-
nation law, for example, litigants should consider the current trend to-
ward a more conservative federal judiciary" and the concomitant
contraction of federal employment discrimination claims 2 and measure
these factors against any perceived improvement in the quality and ex-
pertise of the state judiciaries' s and developing areas of protection for
plaintiffs under state employment discrimination law.' 4
At one time, the perceived superiority of federal employment dis-
crimination laws and greater enthusiasm of the federal judiciary for
their enforcement led plaintiffs to select federal forums in almost reflex
fashion. 5 Today the forum selection process is far more complex, and
the presence of many variables contributes to that complexity.
11. See infra notes 237-41 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 257-90 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 168-71 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 184-208 and accompanying text.
15. Arterton, Employment Discrimination Claims in State Court: A Laboratory for Experi-
mentation, 13 N.Y.U. Rxv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 499, 499 (1984-85) (noting that lawyers were "previ-
ously well-conditioned" to choose federal law and federal courts for employment discrimination
litigation).
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This Note suggests a way for employment discrimination litigants
to develop an analytical framework to guide them in selecting a forum.
Part II outlines the Yellow Freight decision and identifies some ques-
tions the opinion raises for employment discrimination litigants engag-
ing in the forum selection process. Part III reviews the modern parity
debate and explores how litigants, by evaluating the issues raised by the
debate at a second, more litigant-oriented level, might use that debate
to develop an analytical framework for forum selection. Part IV dis-
cusses the development of such a framework in the context of employ-
ment discrimination law. To this end, Part IV examines the changing
face of state employment discrimination law and litigation and explores
why some plaintiffs now may prefer to seek recovery in state court and
solely under state law. Part IV also addresses the recent trend toward a
more conservative federal judiciary and the importance of that trend to
employment discrimination litigants. Finally, Part IV suggests how liti-
gants might weigh these factors in their search for the most amenable
forum. This Note concludes that employment discrimination litigants
can restructure and individualize the parity debate and use it to de-
velop an analytical framework for the forum selection process that they
can apply on a flexible, case-by-case, forum-by-forum basis. In this way,
litigants can use the selection process to their greatest advantage.
1H. THE YELLOW FREIGHT DECISION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
A. Prior Decisions
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Yellow Freight, both state
and federal courts disagreed on whether federal courts had exclusive
jurisdiction over Title VII claims. 6 Much of this confusion stemmed
from the absence of any express language in the statute providing for
either exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction.'7 The Court consistently had
held that analysis in questions of exclusive jurisdiction must begin from
a presumption that state courts have the authority and competence to
hear federal claims.'8 Only when Congress expressly or implicitly vested
16. See Note, supra note 9, at 310-16 & nn.97 & 122 (discussing disagreement among the
courts and citing cases ruling in favor of and against concurrent jurisdiction).
17. Section 706(f)(3) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (1988), pro-
vides in part: "Each United States district court and each United States court of a place subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States shall have jurisdiction of actions brought under [Title VII]."
The statute does not mention state courts.
18. The Court first articulated this presumption in Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130 (1876).
The Court observed that the state court has jurisdiction "where it is not excluded by express
provision, or by incompatibility in its exercise arising from the nature of the particular case." Id. at
136; see also Tafflin v. Levitt, 110 S. Ct. 792, 795 (1990) (finding a "deeply rooted presumption in
favor of concurrent state court jurisdiction"); Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473,
478 (1981) (noting that "the Court begins with the presumption that state courts enjoy concurrent
1991] 645
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exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts would the presumption of
concurrent jurisdiction be overcome.19 Title VII contains no express res-
ervation of exclusive federal jurisdiction, and both the state courts and
the federal district courts disagreed as to whether they could draw such
an implication from the statute's language and legislative history.20
Despite the conflicting opinions of the state and federal district
courts, the few federal circuit court decisions prior to Yellow Freight
concluded that federal courts did have exclusive jurisdiction over Title
VII claims.21 In Valenzuela v. Kraft, Inc.22 the Ninth Circuit found that
the text of Title VII implied that Congress intended to vest jurisdiction
over Title VII claims solely in the federal courts2s because its enforce-
ment provisions referred only to federal courts24 and other parts of the
statute incorporated federal procedure.2 5 The court found further sup-
port for its conclusion in that the legislative history made no mention of
state courts.26 Finally, the court noted that the Supreme Court had not
listed state courts in a recent discussion of the Title VII forums availa-
ble to litigants.2 7 From this combination of factors, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over Title VII
jurisdiction"); Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 508 (1962) (stating that the Claf-
lin principle "has remained unmodified through the years").
19. In Gulf Offshore, 453 U.S. at 478, the Court outlined three circumstances in which the
presumption of concurrent jurisdiction could be overcome: "[T]he presumption of concurrent juris-
diction can be rebutted [1] by an explicit statutory directive, [2] by unmistakable implication from
legislative history, or [3] by a clear incompatibility between state court jurisdiction and federal
interests."
20. See Note, supra note 9, at 311 n.97 (citing cases holding that federal courts have exclu-
sive jurisdiction over Title VII); id. at 314 n.122 (citing cases holding that state courts have concur-
rent jurisdiction over Title VII).
21. Long v. Florida, 805 F.2d 1542, 1546 (11th Cir. 1986) rev'd on other grounds, 487 U.S.
223 (1988); Bradshaw v. General Motors Corp., 805 F.2d 110, 112 (3d Cir. 1986); Jones v. Inter-
mountain Power Project, 794 F.2d 546, 553 (10th Cir. 1986); Valenzuela v. Kraft, Inc., 739 F.2d
434, 435-36 (9th Cir. 1984).
22. 739 F.2d 434 (9th Cir. 1984).
23. Id. at 435-36.
24. Id. at 435. The court did note, however, that § 706(f)(3) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(f)(3) (1988), "does not expressly state that federal jurisdiction shall be exclusive ... [and,] by
itself,. . . does not exclude the possibility of concurrent state-court jurisdiction." Valenzuela, 739
F.2d at 435; see supra note 17 (quoting relevant portion of statute).
25. Valenzuela, 739 F.2d at 435-36. The court referred to § 7060) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(j) (1988), providing for appeals according to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291-1292 (1988), and §
706(f)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(2) (1988), providing for the expedition of Title VII cases and for
"preliminary or temporary relief . . . in accordance with rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure." Valenzuela, 739 F.2d at 436.
26. Valenzuela, 739 F.2d at 436.
27. Id. The court referred to Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974), in which
the Supreme Court had listed the forums available to employment discrimination victims as: the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), state and local agencies, and the federal
courts. Id. at 47.
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claims.2 8 The Third,"' Tenth,30 and Eleventh"' Circuits subsequently
reached the same conclusion.
B. The Seventh Circuit's Rejection of Valenzuela
The Seventh Circuit rejected the Valenzuela reasoning in Donnelly
v. Yellow Freight System, Inc."2 Unlike the Valenzuela court, the Sev-
enth Circuit refused to read between the lines of the statute and its
legislative history to find that Congress intended to divest state courts
of jurisdiction over Title VII claims simply because the statute and leg-
islative history refer only to federal courts and federal procedure.33 The
court instead found support for an implication of concurrent jurisdic-
tion in the statute's legislative history, in which Congress recognized
the importance of encouraging the development and use of state em-
ployment discrimination laws and remedies in addition to Title VII.34
Because prior state actions could preclude Title VII claims later
brought in federal court, the court concluded that a system of exclusive
jurisdiction would deter plaintiffs from pursuing state-created rights in
the state court system. 5 This deterrence, in turn, would hinder the de-
velopment and evolution of state employment discrimination law and
thus violate the express intent of Congress. 6
The Seventh Circuit found no inherent incompatibility between Ti-
tle VII and its adjudication in state courts. 7 In Gulf Offshore Co. v.
Mobil Oil Corp.38 the Supreme Court had suggested that the presence
of certain factors might rebut the presumption of concurrent jurisdic-
tion even if the statute or its legislative history does not imply that
Congress intended to create exclusive federal jurisdiction.3 9 Examples of
significant factors include the need for uniform interpretation of a stat-
ute, an expertise in the field particular to federal judges, or a greater
28. Valenzuela, 739 F.2d at 436.
29. Bradshaw v. General Motors Corp., 805 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1986).
30. Jones v. Intermountain Power Project, 794 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1986).
31. Long v. Florida, 805 F.2d 1542 (11th Cir. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 487 U.S. 223
(1988).
32. 874 F.2d 402 (7th Cir. 1989), afd, 110 S. Ct. 1566 (1990).
33. 874 F.2d at 406-07.
34. Id. at 407.
35. Id. The court referred to 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1988), which requires federal courts to give
full faith and credit to state court judgments, and to Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456
U.S. 461, 484-85 (1982), in which the Supreme Court held that state court judgments may preclude
Title VII claims subsequently presented in federal court. Yellow Freight, 874 F.2d at 407. For a
discussion of Kremer, see supra note 5.
36. Yellow Freight, 874 F.2d at 407.
37. Id. at 407-08.
38. 453 U.S. 473 (1981).
39. Id. at 483-84.
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receptivity of federal courts to the enforcement of a federally created
claim.40 According to the Seventh Circuit, however, none of these fac-
tors compelled a finding of exclusive jurisdiction in the case of Title VII
claims.41 A large body of federal precedent, which the Supremacy
Clause bound the state courts to follow, would guide the state courts
and help ensure uniformity.42 Although federal judges had greater ex-
pertise in adjudicating Title VII matters, state judges had much experi-
ence interpreting and enforcing state employment discrimination laws,
thus, ensuring their familiarity with similar Title VII issues.43 The court
also reasoned that state courts would be no less hospitable to Title VII
claims than federal courts.44 State courts already exercised concurrent
jurisdiction over section 198345 claims and claims arising under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act.4 6 This experience indicated that
state courts already were sensitized to the policies underlying Title VII
and suggested that state courts could provide a fair and receptive forum
for Title VII claims.47 Finally, that the federal courts remained open to
plaintiffs-and through removal to defendants-further guaranteed the
availability of a fair forum.48 Thus, the court found nothing in the lan-
guage, history, or policies underlying Title VII to defeat a presumption
of concurrent jurisdiction.49  The Supreme Court granted Yellow
Freight's petition for certiorari 50 to resolve the split among the circuits
created by the Seventh Circuit's decision.5'
C. The Supreme Court's Finding of Concurrent Jurisdiction
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion which closely paral-
leled that of the Seventh Circuit, also concluded that state courts have
concurrent jurisdiction over Title VII claims. 52 The Court reiterated
40. Id.
41. Yellow Freight, 874 F.2d at 407.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 407-08.
44. Id. at 408.
45. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Section 1983 prohibits discriminatory treatment "under (the]
color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the Dis-
trict of Columbia." Id. The court observed that "similar, although not identical policy issues un-
derlie both" Title VII and § 1983. Yellow Freight, 874 F.2d at 408.
46. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988), prohibits dis-
crimination based on age. As the court noted, the statute closely parallels Title VII. Yellow
Freight, 874 F.2d at 408-09.
47. Yellow Freight, 874 F.2d at 408-09.
48. Id. at 408.
49. Id. at 405-09.
50. Yellow Freight System, Inc. v. Donnelly, 110 S. Ct. 363 (1989).
51. Yellow Freight System, Inc. v. Donnelly, 110 S. Ct. 1566, 1568 (1990).
52. Id. at 1570.
648 [Vol. 44:641
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that its analysis must begin with a presumption of concurrent jurisdic-
tion, a presumption that only an affirmative ouster of the state courts
by Congress would defeat.53 The Court noted that unlike other statutes
in which Congress expressly vested exclusive jurisdiction in the federal
courts, Title VII contains no such provision.5 4 This omission alone, the
Court suggested, might provide sufficient proof that Congress did not
intend to divest state courts of jurisdiction.5 5 Nevertheless, the Court
explored whether it could infer, from either the legislative history of
Title VII or some inherent incompatibility between the statute's proce-
dural provisions and its enforcement by state courts, that Congress un-
mistakably intended the federal courts to retain exclusive jurisdiction
over Title VII claims.5 "
The Court acknowledged the persuasiveness of the argument that
both the courts and agencies that interpret and enforce Title VII and
most of the legislators responsible for its enactment and amendment
believed that the federal courts had exclusive jurisdiction over Title VII
litigation. 7 Nevertheless, the Court concluded that these beliefs were
insufficient to rebut the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction, a core
value of federalism.58 The Court also dismissed the suggestion that the
enforcement procedures of Title VII were incompatible with state court
jurisdiction.5 9 Noting that in prior cases it had rejected similar argu-
ments that statutory references to specific federal procedures necessa-
rily implied exclusive federal jurisdiction, the Court likewise rejected
arguments that provisions for appeals under 28 U.S.C. sections 1291
and 1292, for injunctive relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65,
and for the appointment of special masters under Rule 53 necessitate
exclusive federal jurisdiction over Title VII litigation. 0 The Court, how-
ever, offered no explanation of how state courts should accommodate
these procedures.61 Finally, the Court observed that the greater exper-
53. Id. at 1568. The Court cited Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473 (1981),
and its recent decision in Taftlin v. Levitt, 110 S. Ct. 792 (1990). In Tafflin the Court found that
the state courts had concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts over claims arising under the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C §§ 1961-1968 (1988). Taf-
flin, 110 S. Ct. at 799.
54. Yellow Freight, 110 S. Ct. at 1568-69.
55. Id. at 1569 (noting that the omission of an express provision of exclusive jurisdiction "is
strong, and arguably sufficient, evidence that Congress had no such intent").
56. Id. at 1569-70.
57. Id. at 1569-70 & n.4.
58. Id. at 1569. The Court stated that even if the expectations that the federal courts would
have exclusive jurisdiction "were universally shared," they would not be "an adequate substitute
for a legislative decision to overcome the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction." Id.
59. Id. at 1569-70,
60. Id. at 1570.
61. One commentator has suggested that the incorporation of federal procedures need not be
1991] 649
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tise of federal judges in Title VII matters is simply one factor that
plaintiffs should consider in the forum selection process and is not a
reason to question the competence of state courts to adjudicate Title
VII claims.2 The Court then affirmed the holding of the Seventh
Circuit."3
D. Some Questions Suggested by Yellow Freight
The Supreme Court's holding in Yellow Freight was consistent
with its prior decisions on exclusive federal jurisdiction. 4 Nevertheless,
the decision does raise some important questions that now confront po-
tential employment discrimination litigants. First, the decision raises
the question of whether the Court's finding of concurrent jurisdiction
necessarily results in the conclusion that litigants now may consider
state courts equal to their federal counterparts. Are state courts, at
some primary level, in parity with federal courts? The modern parity
debate poses this question without providing a conclusive answer.6 5
Some of the language in Yellow Freight indicates that the Court's an-
swer to this question, at least in theory, is presumptively yes.66
Other language in the Court's decision, however, suggests that in
some instances, at least in the area of employment discrimination law,
litigants might prefer one forum over the other-that state and federal
forums will not always be equally capable or receptive when presented
with certain claims. By suggesting that plaintiffs should consider vary-
ing degrees of expertise when selecting a forum, 7 the Court seems to
contradict the implication of parity found in its ruling. Yet one can in-
terpret this apparent contradiction as a suggestion that a second level
of parity exists, a level that litigants should explore in the forum selec-
viewed as incompatible with concurrent jurisdiction. Section 706(f)(2) of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(2) (1988), which provides for the use of Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 65 temporary and injunctive relief procedures, applies only to situations in which the EEOC
seeks injunctive relief. Because Congress has the authority to limit the power of federal agencies,
requiring state courts to apply Rule 65 in this circumstance does not violate state sovereignty.
Furthermore, other sections incorporating federal procedures can be read to apply exclusively to
federal courts. See Note, Concurrent Jurisdiction Over Title VII Actions, 42 WASH. & LEE L. Rxv.
1403, 1418-23 (1985). But see Mishkind & Burns, How the Supreme Court's Decision in Donnelly
v. Yellow Freight May Affect Title VII Claims, 16 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 257, 263 (1990) (questioning
the compatibility of Title VII's incorporation of federal procedure and concurrent jurisdiction).
62. Yellow Freight, 110 S. Ct. at 1570.
63. Id.
64. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
65. See infra notes 69-144 and accompanying text.
66. In Yellow Freight the Court stated that "[u]nder our 'system of dual sovereignty, we
have consistently held that state courts have inherent authority and are thus presumptively com-
petent to adjudicate"' federal claims. 110 S. Ct. at 1568 (emphasis added) (quoting Tafflin v.
Levitt, 110 S. Ct. 792, 795 (1990)).
67. Id. at 1570.
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tion process.
At this second level, the evaluation of parity is individualized by
taking into account the particular courts and the particular claims in-
volved. The Yellow Freight decision hints that plaintiffs may find it
valuable to consider the relative competence, expertise, and receptivity
of the state and federal courts and the procedural advantages and dis-
advantages that may inhere in the choice of forum. Differences, how-
ever, may be creatures of both choices of forum and choices of law.
Thus, plaintiffs also should compare the availability of rights and reme-
dies under federal and state law.
Many of the issues raised in Yellow Freight concern factors that
are central to the forum selection process in a system of concurrent ju-
risdiction. The modern parity debate provides a starting point for de-
fining, understanding, and evaluating these factors in general terms.
For litigants to use the forum selection process to their greatest advan-
tage, however, they should explore the issue of parity within an individ-
ualized structure that measures these factors on a case-specific basis.
III. THE MODERN PARITY DEBATE AND BEYOND: AN IMPASSE AT THE
PRIMARY LEVEL OF PARITY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF A FRAMEWORK
FOR FORUM SELECTION AT A SECOND LEVEL
The Framers of the Constitution were the first to disagree about
the proper role of the state courts in adjudicating federal claims.6 8 Arti-
cle III of the Constitution, which grants Congress discretion to create
lower federal courts," is the result of a protracted debate among the
Framers about whether state courts rather than a national judiciary
should be the primary enforcers of federal law.70 At the center of the
debate stood two conflicting core values of the Constitution: federalism
and the need for a uniform body of national law.71
In recent years scholars have cast this ongoing debate in terms of
"parity. 17 2 The modern debate acknowledges its historical roots in the
tension between the core values of federalism and national uniformity,
but focuses primarily on the institutional differences that bear directly
and indirectly on evaluating the parity of the federal and state judicial
systems. Yet no consensus exists among the major schools of the de-
bate, and some of the debaters themselves recognize that the debate
68. See supra note 8.
69. Article I provides in part: "The judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish." US. CONST. art. I, § 1.
70. See supra note 8.
71. See Fallon, supra note 7, at 1142-64.
72. See supra note 9.
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has reached an impasse.73 The question then becomes whether the de-
bate has outlived its usefulness. 4 This section surveys the major
schools of the modern parity debate7 5 and suggests that, although the
debate may remain unsettled at its primary level, consideration of the
debate's issues at a second level can provide a useful analytical frame-
work to litigants and attorneys engaged in the forum selection process.
A. The Skeptics
In 1977, criticizing recent Supreme Court decisions which implied
that state courts are equal to their federal counterparts in enforcing
constitutional and constitutionally based federal rights, Professor Burt
Neuborne posited that federal courts are and are likely to remain the
better forum for the vindication of those rights.76 He noted that parties
seeking broad readings of federal rights consistently preferred federal
forums.7 7 For Neuborne, this preference was convincing evidence that
litigants and their attorneys knew what the Court had failed either to
recognize or to acknowledge-that a choice of a federal or state forum
can alter the outcome of litigation. 8
Neuborne suggested three institutional factors that account for
73. See Chemerinsky, supra note 8, at 236, 255-56; Neuborne, Toward Procedural Parity in
Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REv. 725, 725-26 (1981) (acknowledging that the
debate "has reached an impasse").
74. Professor Erwin Chemerinsky suggests that the debate indeed has outlived its usefulness.
He observes that "focusing on parity is futile because ultimately the issue of parity is an empirical
question for which no empirical measure is possible." Chemerinsky, supra note 8, at 256. For a
summary of Chemerinsky's position, see infra notes 115-41 and accompanying text.
75. This section surveys only a small portion of the scholarship on the issue of parity. It does
not purport to be a comprehensive discussion of the vast literature on the subject. Nevertheless,
the Author believes that the scholars chosen well represent the major schools of the debate.
76. Neuborne, supra note 7, at 1105-06. Neuborne expressed concern over the Supreme
Court's ruling in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), specifically that the federal court could
refuse to grant habeas corpus review to a state prisoner on a fourth amendment search and seizure
claim when the state had provided a full and fair opportunity for the defendant to litigate the
claim at trial. Neuborne criticized the Court's apparent assumption "that state and federal courts
are functionally interchangeable forums." Neuborne, supra note 7, at 1105. Neuborne argued that
"the assumption of parity is, at best, a dangerous myth" that has resulted in an improper channel-
ling of constitutional litigation into state courts. Id.
Neuborne's definition of the better forum for constitutional litigation is "the one more likely
to assign a very high value to the protection of the individual, . . . against the collective, so that
the definition of the individual right in question will receive its most expansive reading and its
most energetic enforcement." Neuborne, supra note 73, at 727. Not all participants in the parity
debate agree with this definition. See, e.g., Redish, supra note 9, at 337-38 (defining the better
forum as that which is most likely to reach a decision "on the basis of a fair and neutral assess-
ment of law, policy and facts"); see also infra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
77. Neuborne, supra note 7, at 1106.
78. Id.; see also Neuborne, supra note 73, at 729 & n.10 (acknowledging the Court's partial
retreat from its assumption of parity in Stone and its apparent recognition that the "choice of
forum in constitutional cases is, if not outcome-determinative, at least outcome-relevant").
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both the disparity in the treatment of federal rights between the two
forums and the superiority of the federal judiciary.7 9 First, because fed-
eral judges are selected from a smaller, more elite, and better qualified
pool than state judges, the federal judiciary enjoys a higher level of
technical competence.8 0 Second, because the federal judiciary is the
product of an elite tradition, a tradition inextricably bound to the en-
forcement of federal rights, federal judges feel greater pressure than
their state counterparts to fulfill a guardianship role.s- Third, federal
judges, chosen by appointment and given life tenure, enjoy a greater
independence from the political pressures and majoritarian influences
brought to bear on state judges who are subject to election or reap-
pointment processes.2
Professor Martin Redish agrees with Neuborne's general conclusion
of federal court superiority.83 Redish, however, defines the better forum
not in terms of its propensity to broaden federal rights, 4 but rather as
the forum that intuitively seems more likely to issue an impartial judg-
ment that accurately reflects federal law and policy.85 Redish narrows
the focus of the parity debate by emphasizing the value of an indepen-
dent federal judiciary.86 For Redish, the institutional superiority of the
federal judiciary as an enforcer of federal rights is clear, given its insu-
lation from political pressure 7 and its greater expertise.88
Despite their firm belief in the superiority of the federal judiciary,
neither Neuborne nor Redish rejects the system of concurrent jurisdic-
tion. Neuborne acknowledges that the availability of state courts for the
enforcement of federal rights can provide a desirable alternative if a
79. Neuborne, supra note 7, at 1120-21. Neuborne focused his comparison on state and fed-
eral trial courts. Id. at 1118-19.
80. Id. at 1121-24. Neuborne further noted that higher federal salaries give the federal judici-
ary a more forceful recruiting tool than the states. Better qualified staffs also contribute to the
superior technical competence of the federal judiciary. Id. at 1121-22.
Elsewhere, Neuborne has suggested that federal courts also offer litigants certain procedural
advantages. Federal procedure offers attorneys a uniform body of procedural law and thereby a
degree of familiarity and predictability. Furthermore, federal procedure is litigant-friendly because
it affords litigants simplified pleading, liberal discovery, and superior class action procedure among
other advantages. Such advantages, Neuborne proposes, contribute to the overall superiority of the
federal courts. See Neubome, supra note 73, at 733-47.
81. Neuborne, supra note 7, at 1124-27. Neuborne called this the "psychological set" of thejudiciary. Neuborne also noted that federal judges are more likely to be receptive to Supreme
Court dictates because they are members of the same bureaucratic structure. Id. at 1124-25.
82. Id. at 1127-28.
83. Redish, supra note 9, at 329-30 & n.4.
84. See supra note 76.
85. Redish, supra note 9, at 337-38.
86. Id. at 333-38.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 333. Redish suggests that federal courts, merely by exposure, have greater expertise
in federal law. Likewise, state courts have greater expertise in state law. Id.
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state court is likely to read the right in question expansively. When
favorable state court precedent exists, under either state or federal law,
a litigant may wish to take advantage of the certainty offered in state
court.819 Neuborne also recognizes that if the Supreme Court is unsym-
pathetic to a given position, the institutional superiority of the federal
courts may be an insufficient reason to warrant their selection over
state courts.90 Redish notes that interaction between the state and fed-
eral judiciaries is a beneficial by-product of federalism-one that facili-
tates an exchange of knowledge and expertise.9' He disputes, however,
that the values of federalism diminish the argument for the institu-
tional superiority of the federal judicial system.92
For both Neuborne and Redish, the central concern of the parity
debate is ensuring that the federal courts, as inherently superior fo-
rums, remain available to litigants seeking vindication of federal
rights.93 Although a valid and important concern, this formulation fo-
cuses broadly on judicially developed systems of case allocation and
does little to enlighten litigants and attorneys engaged in the process of
forum selection. As Redish openly acknowledges, litigants bring a dif-
ferent perspective to the parity debate. 4 Litigants, however, can use
the existing debate to inform the forum selection process. Many of the
issues Neuborne and Redish raise in their evaluation of parity at its
primary level suggest factors litigants can use in parity analysis at a
second, more individualized and litigant-oriented level.
B. The Believers
The school of parity believers comprises two distinct branches.
Some parity believers share Professor Redish's view that reaching con-
clusions about the existence of parity between state and federal courts
is primarily an intuitive rather than an empirical process.9 5 Other be-
lievers, however, maintain that empirical evidence establishes the exis-
tence of parity between the two forums.9 Despite differences in
89. Neuborne, supra note 73, at 731.
90. Id.
91. Redish, supra note 9, at 331-32.
92. Id. at 331-33. Although Redish acknowledges that an empirical solution to the debate is
unlikely, he argues that this lack of hard proof does not render the debate unresolvable. In the
absence of empirical evidence, institutional superiority is the dispositive factor and leads to "an all
but inescapable" conclusion of "nonparity." Id. at 332-33.
93. See Neuborne, supra note 7, at 1131; Redish, supra note 9, at 335-36.
94. Redish, supra note 9, at 338.
95. See Bator, supra note 7, at 623 (commenting that the arguments of parity skeptics "are
intuitive [and] rest on human insight rather than on empirical evidence"); cf. Redish, supra note 9,
at 332-33 (acknowledging that the debate cannot be resolved empirically, but arguing that
nonparity is still the logical conclusion).
96. See Solimine & Walker, supra note 8, at 222-48; Solimine & Walker, supra note 9, at
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method, the analyses and conclusions of the two branches are closely
parallel. Both branches reject the skeptics' conclusion that the federal
courts are institutionally superior to state courts.
Professor Paul Bator suggests that a broad comparison of the state
and federal judiciaries is a deceptive oversimplification in light of the
many variables at work within each system.9 7 The quality of both the
state and federal judiciaries, Bator argues, undoubtedly varies widely
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The skeptics also fail to factor the
state appellate courts sufficiently into the equation. Bator suggests that
quality and independence of state judiciary systems often are enhanced
significantly at the appellate levels and that this enhancement under-
mines the argument for the institutional superiority of the federal
judiciary."
Bator also posits that the skeptics may measure the receptivity of
the state courts to federal claims from a biased standard, a standard
that equates rejection of a particular federal claim with the rejection of
all federal values.100 He proposes that the rejection of a federal claim
simply may reflect a choice among conflicting federal values and that
the state courts are not necessarily less sensitive to the entire body of
federal values merely because they might make that choice differently
than the federal courts. 101 Indeed, Bator suggests that state courts can
provide a valuable and necessary second perspective that is lost when
federal issues are confined to the federal judicial system.10 2
Professors Michael Solimine and James Walker agree with Bator
that a proper comparison of the two systems should include the state
131-48.
97. Bator, supra note 7, at 629-30.
98. Id. at 629. Pointing to recent improvement in the receptivity of many state courts to
federal claims, Bator observes that the quality of courts is not a static factor. Id. at 620-30. He
further suggests that the skeptics' assumption that the federal judiciary is more sensitive to the
enforcement of federal rights is, in part, the product of the historical experience of racial segrega-
tion. Because that era has passed, Bator argues, the assumption no longer has merit. Id. at 631.
Michael Solimine and James Walker similarly argue that historical evidence of nonparity has only
a "tangential relevance" to any current evaluation of parity. They point to the lack of any evidence
that past aberrations, such as those that occurred during the post-Reconstruction period and the
early years of the civil rights movement, are entrenched in the current state court system. Solimine
& Walker, supra note 8, at 223-25.
99. Bator, supra note 7, at 629-30.
100. Id. at 631-33.
101. Id. Bator observes: "Even in the sphere of individual rights, it is misleading to suppose
that the rejection of a particular constitutional claim imports less fidelity to constitutional values
than its vindication." Id. at 633. For example, when a court rejects a claim that a state law violates
the Constitution, it may reject a particular individual's constitutional claims but at the same time
uphold "principles of separation of powers and federalism which themselves have constitutional
status." Id.
102. Id. at 634 (observing that "insight into issues of federal constitutional law should be
available from both perspectives").
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appellate courts, which tend to compensate for possible deficiencies of
state trial courts.103 Additionally, Solimine and Walker cite recent
surveys and scholarship indicating increases in the salaries, support
staff, and professionalism of state trial judges-measures that diminish
the impact of the skeptics' technical superiority argument.104 Further-
more, citing modern studies that show no strong, consistent correlation
between the decisions of state judges and their political accountabil-
ity,'0 5 Solimine and Walker deny that the accountability of state court
judges through the electoral process necessarily influences their
decisions.106
Solimine and Walker also offer data gathered in a survey of state
appellate and federal district court opinions as direct empirical proof
that state courts provide a forum roughly equal to that of federal courts
in the vindication of federal rights.0 7 This survey, they argue, further
dilutes the skeptics' arguments by demonstrating that no systemic bias
against the enforcement of federal rights taints the state court sys-
tem. 1 08 Finally, Solimine and Walker assert that evidence of the institu-
tional superiority central to the skeptics' position is insufficient to
justify a conclusion of nonparity. 09
The believers also offer normative arguments in favor of operating
under an assumption of federal and state court parity. Because state
courts inevitably will continue to decide at least some federal claims,
treating them as second-class members of the judiciary may be counter-
103. Solimine & Walker, supra note 8, at 226 & n.71.
104. Id. at 226-27 & nn.72-75.
105. Id. at 230-31. Furthermore, recent data showed an increase in the number of state
judges that are appointed rather than elected. Id. at 228 & n.77.
106. Id. at 230-31. Solimine and Walker note that evidence of voter apathy also dilutes the
arguments of the skeptics. Id. at 231.
107. Id. at 232-46. Solimine and Walker surveyed state appellate court opinions and com-
pared the percentage of rulings in favor of and against individual constitutional rights. The claims
surveyed included those made under the first and fourth amendments and the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Overall, 36% of the claims were upheld, and 64% were de-
nied. State courts upheld claims in 32% of their cases; federal courts upheld claims in 41%. These
individual figures, compared with the 36% overall figure, led Solimine and Walker to conclude that
state courts are not clearly reluctant to uphold claims that federal district courts would uphold. Id.
at 240. For further evaluations of the data collected, see id. at 242 & Table I1, 243-44 & Table IV.
For Solimine and Walker's response to criticism of their survey, see Solimine & Walker, supra note
9, at 137-148.
108. Solimine & Walker, supra note 8, at 246, 252.
109. Id. at 225-32. Although Solimine and Walker concede that the system of appointment
and life tenure affords the federal judiciary greater insulation from majoritarian influence, they
find the evidence that political accountability influences the decisions of state judges unconvincing
and insufficient to warrant a conclusion of nonparity. Id. at 230-31; see also Solimine & Walker,
supra note 9, at 137 (reaffirming prior conclusion "that the difference between federal and state
judges is not sufficient to negate a presumption in favor of parity").
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productive and a self-fulfilling prophecy. 110 In contrast, starting from
the presumption that state courts are competent forums, willing to en-
force federal rights enthusiastically, helps ensure that the assumption
of parity is a self-fulfilling prophesy."1 ' Embracing a system of concur-
rent jurisdiction demonstrates confidence in the competence and ability
of state courts and provides them an incentive to assume an equal role
in the enforcement of federal rights." 2 Furthermore, the expertise of
state courts will increase with additional exposure to federal claims.'"
Professors Bator, Solimine, and Walker agree that at least some
form of nascent parity exists between the state and federal courts. Ba-
tor's argument is essentially a counterintuitive critique of the skeptics'
analysis. Solimine and Walker have attempted to take the debate
outside the realm of intuition and give it a quantitative foundation.
Nevertheless, with many variables affecting the outcome of litigation,
perhaps Redish and others suggest correctly that no empirical answer
to the parity question exists, at least when the question is asked at its
primary level.114 As do the skeptics, the believers focus the debate on
the proper role of the state courts in the enforcement of federal rights.
Again, this broad focus is more allocation-oriented than litigant-ori-
ented. Nevertheless, by offering alternative interpretations of the fac-
tors common to the analyses of parity at the primary and secondary
levels, the believers' arguments can bring balance to the forum selection
process.
110. See Bator, supra note 7, at 625 (observing that "[i]f we want state judges to feel institu-
tional responsibility for vindicating federal rights, it is counterproductive to be grudging in giving
them the opportunity to do so"); Solimine & Walker, supra note 8, at 249 (acknowledging that
preventing "state judges from hearing federal cases due to perceived institutional differences...
[may create] a self-fulfilling prophecy"). But cf. Neuborne, supra note 7, at 1129-30 (arguing that
even if continued avoidance of state courts does create a self-fulfilling prophecy, too much is at
stake in important constitutional issues to resort to state courts for the sake of improving
expertise).
111. Bator, supra note 7, at 624-29.
112. Id. at 624. Solimine and Walker observe that factors external to the state and federal
judiciaries also may affect their ability to enforce federal rights. Solimine & Walker, supra note 8,
at 246-50. They note, for example, that the parity debate often fails to account for the role of
attorneys and litigants in securing enforcement of federal rights. Id. at 247-49. They suggest that
attorneys can do much to inform the process and guide state courts through unfamiliar waters,
thus helping the state courts to fulfill their role as co-enforcers of federal rights. Id. at 249-50.
113. Bator, supra note 7, at 624-25.
114. See supra notes 92, 95; see also infra notes 116-22 and accompanying text. The empiri-
cists themselves concede that much of the evidence concerning the competence, receptivity, and
bias of the courts provides only collateral support for arguments either for or against parity.
Solimine & Walker, supra note 8, at 247-48.
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C. Impasse and Alternatives
Professor Erwin Chemerinsky posits that the parity debate has
reached an impasse and, thus, may have outlived its usefulness in de-
termining the proper role for state and federal courts in adjudicating
federal claims.'15 Chemerinsky believes that because no satisfactory em-
pirical answer to the parity question exists,"' the debate cannot move
beyond the realm of intuition and gainsaying." 7 He argues that the pro-
cess of defining the roles of the federal and state judiciaries must move
beyond the framework of the parity debate." 8
Chemerinsky rejects the possibility of an empirical solution to the
debate for several reasons. First, he argues that before an empirical
study can satisfy all debate participants, the participants must reach a
consensus in defining the characteristics of a superior system." 9 The
debaters, however, do not agree on a common standard of quality
against which they can evaluate the state and federal judicial sys-
tems.120 Second, a broad empirical analysis of state and federal court
parity would not reflect interjurisdictional differences in the quality of
either judicial system, nor would it reveal any tendencies of individual
courts to be more or less receptive to specific federal issues. 21 Finally,
Chemerinsky argues that devising an effective methodology for a broad
comparison of the two systems is nearly impossible.'22
Chemerinsky also rejects the dispositive value of intuitive re-
sponses to the question of parity. 23 Arguments based on historical fac-
tors prove unsatisfactory because each side of the debate uses history
selectively. 24 Assumptions about the importance of institutional differ-
ences between the two systems also have failed to resolve the debate.
Without empirical evidence confirming or disproving the conclusions
drawn, neither side is likely to overcome the intuitions and arguments
of the other. 125 Thus, the debate has reached a stalemate. 2
As an alternative method of determining the proper roles of the
115. Chemerinsky, supra note 8, at 255-80.
116. Id. at 256-73.
117. Id. at 256, 278-79. Chemerinsky observes that the debate seems to be "fixed in a litany
that appears as unresolvable and unchangeable as the scripts for the Lite Beer commercials." Id.
at 256.
118. Id. at 236, 279-80.
119. Id. at 258-59.
120. Id. at 257-59; see also supra note 76.
121. Chemerinsky, supra note 8, at 259-60.
122. Id. at 261. Chemerinsky also criticized the Solimine and Walker study at length. Id. at
261-69.
123. Id. at 273-80.
124. Id. at 273-75.
125. Id. at 278-79.
126. Id. at 279.
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federal and state judiciaries in the adjudication of federal claims,
Chemerinsky proposes shifting much of the responsibility for forum al-
location to litigants.127 He argues that litigants presenting constitu-
tional claims should have the choice between state or federal court.12 8
While Chemerinsky's suggested model resembles the present system of
concurrent jurisdiction, it entails three significant changes. 2 9 First, the
presence of a constitutional defense would provide a sufficient basis for
a plaintiff to bring a nonfederal action in federal court.-SO Similarly, de-
fendants presenting constitutional defenses to nonfederal actions
brought in state court would be able to remove to federal court.' Fi-
nally, if a plaintiff chose to present a constitutional claim in state court
and the defendant had no constitutional claim, the defendant could not
remove the case to federal court.13 2
Chemerinsky suggests that several advantages inhere in following
this system of litigant choice. First, the system requires no overall reso-
lution of the parity debate because litigants would make decisions on a
case-specific basis. 33 Furthermore, because the system allows litigants
to seek the forum more likely to protect the particular right in question,
it promotes the enforcement of constitutional rights.'3 Second, because
the litigant-choice system increases the autonomy of litigants, it should
produce concomitant increases in litigant satisfaction. 3 5 Third, because
the system requires no overall judgment of the relative competence of
the federal and state judiciaries, it enhances federalism. 3 e One individ-
ual's decision that a federal forum is preferable in a particular case
threatens the esteem of state judiciaries far less than an overall pro-
nouncement that state courts are inherently inferior to federal courts.3s
Finally, Chemerinsky suggests that both sides of the parity debate
should accept the litigant-choice system. 8' Because the system assures
127. Id. at 300-26.
128. Id.
129. See id. at 312.
130. Id. at 313-14.
131. Id. at 315.
132. Id. at 314-15. If both parties raise constitutional claims, a circumstance Chemerinsky
characterizes as rare, then the current jurisdictional rules would apply. Id. at 313.
133. See id. at 300-02.
134. Id. at 302-05. Chemerinsky suggests that attorneys are in the best position to select the
better forum. They have better access to information about local courts, can research local deci-
sions, can exchange information with other attorneys, and can draw from their own experience.
Chemerinsky concludes, however, that developing empirical proof of the better forum still remains
unlikely. Id. at 302-03.
135. Id. at 306-08.
136. Id. at 308-10.
137. Id. at 308.
138. Id. at 310.
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continued access to federal courts it should satisfy the parity skep-
tics. 39 Conversely, the system should be acceptable to the believers be-
cause it acknowledges the role of state courts as full-fledged enforcers of
constitutional rights.140
Although both Chemerinsky and the parity debaters focus on the
problem of forum allocation, Chemerinsky also recognizes the impor-
tance of forum selection to litigants. As Chemerinsky suggests, a resolu-
tion of the parity debate at its primary level is probably unnecessary for
litigants to use the forum selection process to their advantage.1 41 Yet
Chemerinsky's proposed system, as well as the present system of con-
current jurisdiction, still requires litigants to evaluate potential forums
at the second level of parity. That evaluation cannot avoid the issues
raised by the parity debate completely, but it can approach them from
a narrower, litigant-oriented perspective.
D. A Second Level of Parity: Factors for Developing an Analytical
Framework for Forum Selection
The modern parity debate focuses on the proper role of the state
and federal courts in the adjudication of federal claims and on the allo-
cation of judicial resources within that context. Parity skeptics such as
Neuborne and Redish argue that to ensure the maximum protection of
federal rights, the inherently superior federal courts must remain open
to litigants seeking vindication of those rights.1 42 Parity believers such
as Bator, Solimine, and Walker maintain that state courts can provide
forums equally competent to their federal counterparts and, thus,
should be given every opportunity to become full-fledged co-enforcers
of federal rights. 4" Although the parity debate raises significant ques-
tions, it leaves those questions without definitive answers. Conse-
quently, the debate itself remains unresolved and perhaps
unresolvable.1 44
From the litigant's perspective, the present system of concurrent
jurisdiction lessens the importance of resolving the parity debate at its
primary level because that system generally allows plaintiffs with fed-
eral claims to choose between state and federal forums. To make an
informed choice, however, plaintiffs must engage in a microcosmic ver-
sion of the parity debate by determining which available forum is more
likely to protect the right in question. Defendants contemplating re-
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 300-01.
142. See supra notes 76-94 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 95-114 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
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moval will make similar evaluations. Thus, litigants selecting a forum
will consider many of the same issues raised by the parity debate, but
at a second, more individualized and litigant-oriented level.
Litigants should begin the forum selection process by defining the
standard against which they will measure the relative quality of availa-
ble state and federal courts. This standard is the litigant's definition of
the "better forum. '145 Litigants want to try their cases in the court
more likely to rule in their favor. Therefore, from a litigant's perspec-
tive, outcome defines the better forum. Litigants must recognize that
forum selection may be an outcome-determinative process and should
evaluate relevant factors from this perspective.
In developing an analytical framework for forum selection, litigants
first should consider those factors that may affect the institutional
quality of the particular state and federal courts to which they have
access. Here, the litigant's primary concerns are the competence, recep-
tivity, and bias of the courts in question.146 Because institutional qual-
ity may vary from issue to issue as well as from court to court, however,
litigants should consider both the state and federal issues that might be
raised in their cases. The breadth of rights and remedies available
under state and federal law and the degree to which one may dominate
the desired outcome of the case also will enter the evaluation of poten-
tial forums.
In evaluating the relative competence of the courts in question, liti-
gants should focus primarily on the expertise of the courts in the partic-
ular area of law presented. The dominance of federal issues in which
the federal court has greater expertise than the state court might create
a presumption favoring selection of a federal court. The dominance of
state issues may create a similar presumption favoring state court selec-
tion.147 Nevertheless, the greatest value of expertise is ensuring a desir-
able degree of familiarity with the legal questions and underlying
policies likely to be at issue; therefore, to evaluate a court's expertise a
litigant should consider its experience in deciding issues under similar
or parallel law.148 Finally, an attorney's experience might help compen-
sate for a court's lack of familiarity with a particular issue and may
145. Cf. supra note 76. The litigant's definition more closely resembles Professor Neuborne's
than Professor Redish's.
146. See supra notes 80-88 and accompanying text.
147. Cf. Redish, supra note 9, at 333 (suggesting that state and federal courts are more famil-
iar with and, thus, have more expertise in their respective areas of law).
148. Cf. Donnelly v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 874 F.2d 402, 408 (7th Cir. 1989) (noting
that state courts' experience with their own employment discrimination laws makes them familiar
with discrimination issues), aff'd, 110 S. Ct. 1566 (1990). But cf. Yellow Freight System v. Don-
nelly, 110 S. Ct. 1566, 1570 (1990) (suggesting that the greater experience of federal judges in Title
VII matters is a "factor the plaintiff may weigh when deciding where to file suit").
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temper the importance of the expertise factor.149
Familiarity and expertise, however, do not result necessarily in a
predisposition of a court to rule in the plaintiff's favor. Receptivity or
bias may influence the outcome of a particular case and, thus, become
important considerations in the forum selection process. Historical ten-
dencies are important in evaluating receptivity and bias; however, liti-
gants also must recognize the dynamic nature of these factors. Current
trends in judicial decision making may overcome even long-standing
presumptions created by a court's past history.150
Intertwined with the evaluation of receptivity and bias is the de-
gree of judicial independence necessary to ensure a favorable outcome.
Although most commentators agree that appointment and life tenure
afford the federal judiciary greater insulation from political pressure
and influence,5 the importance of this insulation to a litigant seeking a
particular outcome will depend on both the political volatility of a given
issue and the likelihood that political pressure will influence the
outcome. 152
In addition to evaluating the institutional quality of the available
forums, litigants should evaluate the procedural requirements that may
accompany both the choice of forum and choice of claims and the po-
tential of those requirements to work to a litigant's advantage or disad-
vantage. Even when the evaluation of institutional quality creates a
strong preference for a particular forum, unfavorable procedural rules
may make that preference less desirable. Among the many procedural
elements"'5 that may affect these choices are pendent jurisdiction
149. See supra note 112.
150. For a discussion of current trends in state employment discrimination law, see infra
notes 201-08 and accompanying text. For a discussion of current trends in federal employment
discrimination law, see infra notes 257-90 and accompanying text.
151. See, e.g., Neuborne, supra note 7, at 1127 (noting that federal judges "are as insulated
from majoritarian pressures as is functionally possible"); Redish, supra note 9, at 333 (arguing that
"a clear disparity [exists between] the relative independence levels of state and federal judges");
Solimine & Walker, supra note 8, at 231-32 (conceding that the "superiority of a lifetime appoint-
ment in countering majoritarian pressures is rightly praised," but arguing that political accounta-
bility is unlikely to affect judicial decisions).
152. See Chemerinsky, Evaluating Candidates, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1985, 1989 (1988) (sug-
gesting that "judges are inevitably going to be evaluated based on their past or likely rulings on
specific, controversial topics"); Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1581
(1990) (arguing that "judicial independence necessarily varies from issue to issue"); Neuborne,
supra note 7, at 1128 (arguing that risk of influence is greatest when issues "raise strong political
passions").
153. This list of procedural elements is not exhaustive, but highlights some of the procedures
that may affect the outcome of litigation. Nevertheless, litigants should conduct a thorough evalua-
tion of all potential procedural problems. For a general discussion of the procedural superiority of
the federal judicial system, see Neuborne, supra note 73.
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rules,' 5 ' issue and claim preclusion rules,55 summary judgment proce-
dures,158 class action procedures, 157 and discovery rules. 58 Furthermore,
when a plaintiff has a strong interest in remaining in state court, the
defendant's ability to remove may necessitate the abandonment of fed-
eral claims to protect the plaintiff's choice of a state forum. 5"
In a system of concurrent jurisdiction, plaintiffs with federal claims
generally enjoy the luxury of choosing between state and federal fo-
rums. Nevertheless, in exercising their choice, litigants should not rely
on broad assumptions about the relative competence of the federal and
state judiciaries. Rather, litigants should weigh carefully the many fac-
tors that may make one forum more amenable than the other. Because
forum selection should be case specific, it cannot be a precise science.
By identifying the factors most likely to affect the outcome of a particu-
lar case, however, litigants can use that process to their greatest
advantage.
IV. DEVELOPING A FRAMEWORK FOR FORUM SELECTION IN EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION
Employment discrimination plaintiffs traditionally have preferred
federal law and federal forums.6 0 Recently, however, several commen-
tators have recommended that plaintiffs seriously consider using state
law and state courts in seeking redress for their grievances.'' A growing
number of plaintiffs are following this course. 62 As the role of state law
and state courts in employment discrimination litigation increases, so
does the need for a general framework to guide litigants in the forum
selection process. This section suggests several factors that litigants
154. See infra notes 300-02 and accompanying text.
155. See infra notes 213-14 and accompanying text.
156. See infra notes 297-99 and accompanying text.
157. See infra notes 217-18 and accompanying text; text accompanying note 295.
158. See infra notes 219, 292-93 and accompanying text.
159. See infra notes 210-16 and accompanying text.
160. Arterton, supra note 15; Belton, The Dismantling of the Griggs Disparate Impact The-
ory and the Future of Title VII: The Need for a Third Reconstruction, 8 YALE L. & POL'Y REV.
223, 255 (1990) (noting that "[h]istorically civil rights advocates and litigants have preferred the
federal courts"); Catania, State Employment Discrimination Remedies and Pendent Jurisdiction
Under Title VII: Access to Federal Courts, 32 AM U.L. REV. 777, 787 (1983) (observing that em-
ployment discrimination plaintiffs "will probably prefer to bring federal claims in federal court").
161. See, e.g., Arterton, supra note 15, at 504-05 (suggesting that because of increasing con-
servatism in the federal judiciary, "state courts may be more receptive to employment discrimina-
tion claims"); Belton, supra note 160, at 255-56 (observing that state courts may present a more
amenable alternative to federal courts); Saperstein, Response, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE
509, 512 (1984-85).
162. See Mishkind & Burns, supra note 61, at 260 (noting that in Michigan, where state
employment discrimination law offers broad remedies, plaintiffs are making "calculated deci-
sion[s]" to use state courts); Saperstein, supra note 161, at 512-13 (same in California).
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should consider in evaluating and comparing state and federal forums
and in developing a framework for forum selection in employment dis-
crimination litigation.
A. Evaluating the State Forum
1. Competence, Receptivity, and Bias in the State Judiciaries
As the parity debate demonstrates, much disagreement exists
about the competence, receptivity, and bias of the state courts in adju-
dicating federal claims, particularly those involving civil rights.I s While
some argue that political accountability and lack of expertise work
against the competence and receptivity of the state courts,264 others dis-
count the dispositive value of these factors in evaluating the state judi-
ciaries.16 5 In the area of employment discrimination law, the Yellow
Freight decision seems to place the Supreme Court in the latter
group. 166 Nevertheless, despite the Court's presumption that state
courts generally are competent to hear and decide Title VII issues, the
Court recognizes that litigants themselves must evaluate the compe-
tence of the state courts.167
In order to assess accurately the expertise of the state courts in
employment discrimination law, litigants must look beyond the courts'
lack of experience in Title VII matters. The evaluation process must
take into account a court's experience with state employment discrimi-
nation law and with other federal discrimination statutes within the
state courts' concurrent jurisdiction. 68 Because most states have their
own employment discrimination statutes, several of which are similar or
parallel to Title VII, e9 litigants should have less concern that state
courts will be unfamiliar with the administrative complexities, legal
questions, or underlying policies of federal discrimination laws.17 0 Even
when a particular court or judge lacks familiarity with certain issues,
163. See supra notes 76-114 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 76-94 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 95-114 and accompanying text.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 52-56; note 66 and accompanying text.
167. Yellow Freight System, Inc. v. Donnelly, 110 U.S. 1566, 1570 (1990) (noting that vari-
ance in the expertise of state and federal courts is a "factor that the plaintiff may weigh" in Title
VII forum selection).
168. For a collection of federal statutes currently used to combat employment discrimina-
tion, see infra note 242.
169. For a survey of state employment discrimination statutes and their various provisions,
see infra notes 188-95 and accompanying text. For a compilation of the texts of all state statutes,
see 8A & 8B Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 453:i-457:3513 (1990).
170. See Note, supra note 9, at 319 (suggesting that similar or parallel state laws ensure that
"state courts are likely to have the requisite subject matter expertise and inclination to enforce
federal laws adequately").
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experienced attorneys and federal precedent can help educate a state
court and, therefore, temper the court's lack of expertise. 71 Neverthe-
less, if a case presents particularly complex issues, 172 a lack of expertise
may affect outcome.
The court's receptivity and bias are perhaps of greater concern to
employment discrimination litigants considering a state forum. Many
commentators have suggested that the election and retention proce-
dures still used by most states leave state judges vulnerable to
majoritarian pressures.173 Such vulnerability is particularly threatening
to minorities who are the most frequent victims of discrimination.'- 4
Although parity proponents suggest that the effects of accountability on
the decisions of state courts have been overdramatized, 17 judicial elec-
tions such as the California Supreme Court retention election of 1986
indicate that when state judges rule in a countermajoritarian fashion on
particularly volatile issues, the results can be dramatic. 7 6
171. See Solimine & Walker, supra note 8, at 247-49.
172. Employment discrimination class actions, for example, may be beyond the expertise of
some state courts. See Arterton, supra note 15, at 504-05 (observing that "most state courts are
inexperienced in handling large employment discrimination cases" and that some are unwilling to
certify large classes).
173. See Eule, supra note 152, at 1583-84; Neuborne, supra note 7, at 1127-28; Redish, supra
note 9, at 333-38. The various states currently employ several different methods of judicial selec-
tion that subject state judges to varying degrees of political accountability. These selection systems
include partisan elections, nonpartisan elections, gubernatorial appointment, legislative election,
and merit selection. Merit selection is a variant of gubernatorial appointment in which the gover-
nor selects an appointee from a list of nominees compiled by a judicial nominating committee.
Typically, merit appointees face nonpartisan retention elections after serving a short initial term.
See Pearson & Castle, Alternative Judicial Selection Devices: An Analysis of Texas Judges' Atti-
tudes, 73 JUDICATURE 34, 34 (1989). For a compilation of state judicial selection, retention, removal,
and replacement procedures, see CouNcIL oF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES, 1990-
91, at 204-20, Tables 4.1-4.5.
174. See Wright, In Praise of State Courts: Confessions of a Federal Judge, 11 HAsTINGS
CONsT. L.Q. 165, 185-86 (1984) (observing that "[h]istorically, many state courts have been unable
to free themselves from local pressures and prejudice when adjudicating cases that involved race"
but also suggesting that "it ought not be taken for granted that state courts cannot vindicate the
rights of unpopular minorities within their jurisdiction").
175. See, e.g., Solimine & Walker, supra note 9, at 136 (casting doubt on the "much-heralded
and feared political accountability of the state bench").
176. In the 1986 California judicial retention election, Chief Justice Rose Bird and Associate
Justices Joseph Grodin and Cruz Reynoso lost their seats on the state supreme court after a highly
publicized and particularly vicious campaign. The most hotly debated issue in the campaign was
the voting pattern of the justices on death penalty cases, an issue their opponents brought directly
to the voters in a searing media campaign that equated a vote against the justices as a vote for the
death penalty. Chemerinsky, supra note 152, at 1986-87. Also at issue were recent decisions over-
turning plebiscitary efforts at legislative redistricting. In a high profile media campaign, the jus-
tices' opponents characterized the justices' positions as contrary to the will of the people. Eulej
supra note 152, at 1582-83 & n.353. Former Associate Justice Grodin observed the following about
the 1986 campaign and election:
The message which this phenomenon sends to judges is that if they want to avoid negative
votes, it is best to produce results with which the voters will agree. The risk that judges will
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When evaluating whether the political accountability of state
judges will affect the outcome of a particular case, employment discrim-
ination litigants should consider two issues. First, they must determine
the political environment in which the case is presented. The volatility
of employment discrimination issues may vary in different geographical
areas and at different times within the same geographical area.177 The
sensitivity of judges to political pressure is likely to vary as well; judges
may be particularly susceptible to political pressure during election
years. 1 78 Second, litigants should determine the potential volatility of
their particular case. A high-profile case is more likely to draw public
attention and generate political pressure, while a low-profile case may
slip by the public virtually unnoticed, creating less risk that political
pressure will dictate the outcome.17 9 Some commentators suggest that
gauging the effects of political accountability on the judiciary is virtu-
ally impossible.180 By narrowing their inquiry to specific issues within a
particular state or district, however, litigants may gauge more success-
fully the vulnerability of judges to external political pressure and the
potential of that vulnerability to result in outcome-affecting bias or re-
ceptivity in a particular case.
Political accountability is not the only gauge of receptivity availa-
ble to employment discrimination litigants. Current trends in judicial
decision making and lawmaking are of particular importance in the
ever-evolving area of employment discrimination law. Litigants can use
such trends as a measure of receptivity at all levels of a state court
system. In some state courts, for example, the development of common-
receive and act upon that message, unconsciously if not consciously, is substantial.. . . In any
event, the potential that the pendency or threat of a judicial election is likely to have for
distorting the proper exercise of the judicial function is substantial and palpable.
Grodin, Developing a Consensus of Constraint: A Judge's Perspective on Judicial Retention Elec-
tions, 61 S. CAL. L. Rav. 1969, 1980 (1988).
177. For example, during the highly publicized 1990 senatorial campaign of David Duke in
Louisiana, racial issues were at the forefront. Duke, a former Ku Klux Klan leader, garnered 44%
of the total vote and approximately 60% of the white vote while running on a platform that in-
cluded strong criticism of affirmative action programs. See Maraniss, Duke Emerges from Loss
Stronger than Ever; Ex-Klansman Draws 44% of Louisiana Vote Against 3-Term Senator, Wash.
Post., Oct. 8, 1990, at Al; Schram, Louisiana White Voters Raise Hatred's Banner, Newsday, Oct.
11, 1990 (Viewpoints), at 68 (city ed.).
178. See Chemerinsky, supra note 152, at 1987 (observing that involvement of judges in pre-
election campaign activities, especially fundraising, "might cause people to wonder whether deci-
sions made in the months before a retention election reflect the justice's convictions or a move to
appease the voters").
179. See Eule, supra note 152, at 1581 & nn.350-51 (recognizing that most judicial elections
"are issueless and colorless," but noting that recent studies suggest that the likelihood of voting
against retention increases in direct proportion to a voter's level of knowledge).
180. See, e.g., id. at 1583 (conceding that "[i]t may well be impossible to establish empiri-
cally that the threat of electoral reprisal affects judicial behavior"); Grodin, supra note 176.
[Vol. 44:641
FORUM SELECTION
law alternatives to traditional statutory remedies has expanded the ave-
nues of relief available to plaintiffs and may indicate an increase in the
receptivity of the state judiciaries.'
Perceptions of competence, receptivity, and bias may create a pre-
sumption favoring or disfavoring selection of a state forum. Yet these
factors can vary widely, making broad generalizations about state fo-
rums both difficult and potentially misleading.1 2 Nevertheless, framing
an evaluation of these factors within a specific context can do much to
inform the forum selection process.
2. The Changing Face of State Law
The degree to which state or federal law dominates the outcome of
a case may strengthen a presumption favoring one forum over another.
To protect the choice of a state forum, however, a plaintiff may have to
sacrifice federal claims,'" making a choice between forums a potential
choice between claims as well. Within the forum selection process, the
plaintiff must evaluate and compare rights and remedies available
under state and federal law.
When Congress enacted Title VII in 1964, approximately one-half
of the states had some type of employment discrimination statute."8
Since that time the body of state laws has grown considerably; forty-
nine states have enacted employment discrimination legislation. 8 5 Fur-
thermore, because Congress designed Title VII to supplement, rather
than replace, state laws, plaintiffs may seek recovery under federal and
state laws simultaneously.'8 6
Many state statutes that are similar to Title VH actually provide
more comprehensive coverage than Title VII. Title VII, for example,
181. See infra notes 201-08 and accompanying text (discussing judicial development of com-
mon-law alternatives to statutory employment discrimination laws).
182. See Bator, supra note 7, at 629 (noting that "there are tremendous variations in the
quality of the bench from state to state" among both state and federal judges).
183. Because presenting a federal claim in state court leaves plaintiffs vulnerable to removal
to federal court by defendants, pleading only state claims is the sole means by which plaintiffs can
guarantee that their suits will remain in state court. See infra notes 210-16 and accompanying
text.
184. Catania, supra note 160, at 783 n.24.
185. Alabama is now the only state without a general statute prohibiting employment dis-
crimination, although the Alabama Code does contain provisions providing for equal public em-
ployment opportunities for the blind, the visually impaired, and the physically disabled when the
handicap does not prevent the employee from performing the tasks required. See ALA. CODE §§ 21-
7-1, 21-7-8 (1975). The main statutes of Georgia, Mississippi, and Virginia also apply only to state
employment. See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 45-19-20 to 45-19-42 (1990); Miss. CODE ANN. § 25-9-149
(Supp. 1990); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2.1-116.10, 2.1-374 (1987). For a compilation of the texts of current
state statutes, see 8A & 8B Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 453:i-457:3513 (1990).
186. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47-48 (1973).
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applies to employers with fifteen or more employees.18 7 Some state stat-
utes apply to employers with only a single worker."" Additionally, un-
like Title VII, some state statutes prohibit discrimination based on
marital status"8 9 and sexual preference. 190 Several state statutes also of-
fer broader remedies than those available under Title VII, including re-
covery of punitive91 and compensatory damages.192 Moreover, several
state statutes provide for jury trials while Title VII claimants have no
right to a jury.9
187. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988).
188. The statutes of eight states and the District of Columbia apply to employers of one or
more employees. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.300 (1986); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2502(10) (1987); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 378-1 (1988); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4553 (1989); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 37-
2103 (West 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.01(17) (West Supp. 1991); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-
101(8) (1989); OR REV. STAT. § 659.010(6) (1989); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-13-1(7) (1987). Other
state statutes range in coverage from employers of two or more employees, see Wyo. STAT. § 27-9-
102(b) (1987), to employers of 15 or more employees. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1461(2)
(1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, para. 2-101(B)(1)(a) (Smith-Hurd 1989).
189. Several state statutes prohibit discrimination on the basis of marital status. See ALASKA
STAT. § 18.80.200 (1986); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12,921 (West 1980); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-60
(West 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 711 (1985); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2512 (1987); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 760.01 (West 1986); HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-1 (1988); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, para. 1-102 (Smith-
Hurd 1989); MD. ANN. CODE. art. 49B, § 16 (1986); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.2102 (West 1985);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03 (West Supp. 1991); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-303 (1989); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 48-1104 (1988); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:8 (1984); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-10 (West 1976);
N.Y. Exac. LAW § 296 (McKinney 1982); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-03 (Supp. 1989); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 659.030 (1989).
190. A few state statutes prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation. See D.C. CODE
ANN. § 1-2512 (1987); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990) (excludes
pedophiles); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.36(1)(d) (West 1988).
191. Some state statutes expressly provide for an award of punitive damages. See, e.g., IDAHO
CODE § 67-5908(e) (1989); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.071(2) (West Supp. 1991). Some courts have
found that recovery of punitive damages is within the scope of some state statutes even absent
express provisions for such a remedy. See, e.g., Cancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1982); Abbate v. Hyatt Corp., 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 542 (D.D.C. 1982). Litigants should consult local statutes and case law to assess the current
availability of punitive damages under state statutes.
192. Several state statutes expressly provide for the award of compensatory damages. See,
e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2553(a)(1)(D) (1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1005, -1042 (1986); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 23-1006(D) (West 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.071(2) (West Supp. 1991); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 213.111(2) (Vernon Supp. 1991); N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 297(4)(c) (McKinney 1982). Other stat-
utes may provide for recovery of damages for humiliation and embarrassment. See, e.g., Ky. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 344.230(3)(h) (Baldwin 1983). Some courts have held that compensatory damages are
available under some state statutes. See Cancellier, 672 F.2d at 1312. Litigants should consult
local statutes and case law to assess the current availability of compensatory damages under state
statutes.
193. Some state statutes expressly provide for the availability of jury trials. See, e.g., IDAHO
CODE § 67-5908(1) (1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1011 (1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-13 (1987); I.L
GEN. LAWS § 28-5-24.1 (1986). Some courts have held that other state statutes allow jury trials.
See, e.g., Green v. American Broadcasting Co., 647 F. Supp. 1359 (D.D.C. 1986); Loomis Elec.
Protection, Inc. v. Schaefer, 549 P.2d 1341 (Alaska 1976); Gallaway v. Chrysler Corp., 105 Mich.
App. 1, 306 N.W.2d 368 (1981); Slohoda v. United Parcel Serv., 207 N.J. Super. 145, 504 A.2d 53
(1986). An overwhelming majority of federal courts have held that Title VII litigants have no right
668
1991] FORUM SELECTION 669
The state statutes, however, do have certain drawbacks. Some of
these statutes are the exclusive state remedy for claims falling within
their scope and may bar recovery under other state statutes or com-
mon-law theories.1 9 4 Also, some statutes disallow or fail to provide for
the recovery of attorney's fees.195 Thus, plaintiffs must consider
whether desired remedies are available exclusively under state or fed-
eral law.
In evaluating the breadth of state law, litigants also should look to
state court precedent. Theories of recovery under state statutes in some
jurisdictions may be similar or identical to theories of recovery under
Title VII. In interpreting state statutes, some state courts look to fed-
eral court interpretations of Title VII for guidance;196 others expressly
have adopted federal court Title VII jurisprudence.1 9 7 Recent contrac-
tions of federal employment discrimination law by the Supreme
Court,198 however, may result in a similar contraction of state claims if
a state court employs federal Title VII analysis in its interpretation of
state law. 99 Litigants should study state court decisions for indications
of whether the courts have accepted or may accept the new federal
to a jury trial. See infra note 254.
194. See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 344.270 (Baldwin 1983); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 151B § 9
(Law. Co-op. 1982 & Supp. 1990); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:13 (1984); N.Y. EXEc. LAW § 300
(McKinney 1982); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 962(b) (Purdon 1964); see also infra note 208.
195. At least two state courts have held that their respective state statutes do not permit
recovery of attorney's fees. See Silverstein v. Sisters of Charity, 38 Colo. App. 286, 559 P.2d 716
(1976); Bournewood Hosp., Inc. v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 371 Mass. 303,
358 N.E.2d 235 (1976). Several state statutes make no provision as to the availability of attorney's
fees, including Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Mississippi, Nevada, New York, Ohio, Pennsyl-
vania, South Dakota, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Other states either have statutes expressly provid-
ing for attorney's fees, see, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.130(e) (1986); MICH. Cou. LAWS ANN. §§
37.2605(2)(i), 37.2802 (West 1985), or case law holding that attorney's fees are available. See, e.g.,
Burt v. Abel, 466 F. Supp. 1234 (D.S.C. 1979); E.D. Swett, Inc. v. New Hampshire Comm'n for
Human Rights, 124 N.H. 404, 470 A.2d 921 (1983). Litigants should consult local statutes and case
law to assess the current availability of attorney's fees.
196. See, e.g., Dawson v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 223, 226, 786 P.2d 1074, 1076 (Ct. App.
1990); Lynch v. City of Des Moines, 454 N.W.2d 827, 833 n.5 (Iowa 1990); Chappell v. Southern
Md. Hosp., 320 Md. 483, 496, 578 A.2d 766, 773 (1990); Smith v. FDC Corp., 109 N.M. 514, 517,
787 P.2d 433, 436 (1990); cf. Turner v. IDS Fin. Servs., 459 N.W.2d 143, 146-47 (Minn. App. 1990)
(declining to follow Supreme Court holdings on proper starting point for running Title VII statute
of limitation in applying state law even though the court often looks to Supreme Court interpreta-
tions of Title VII for guidance in interpreting Minnesota Human Rights Act).
197. See Grigoletti v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 118 N.J. 89, 97, 570 A.2d 903, 907 (1990)
(recognizing the adoption of "Supreme Court's analysis of unlawful discrimination claims brought
under Title VII" in application of New Jersey Law Against Discrimination).
198. See infra notes 257-81 and accompanying text.
199. See North Carolina Dep't of Correction v. Hodge, 99 N.C. App. 602, 612, 394 S.E.2d 285,
290 (1990) (adopting mixed-motive evidentiary methodology of Price-Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109
S. Ct. 1775, 1785 (1990)).
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court jurisprudence.20 0 Nevertheless, because some state statutes offer
broader coverage, superior remedies, and jury trials, plaintiffs may find
these statutes attractive supplements or potential alternatives to fed-
eral law.
One of the more interesting developments in state employment dis-
crimination law has been the creation of common-law alternatives to
state and federal statutory schemes and the concomitant erosion of the
traditional employee-at-will doctrine.20 1 Many state courts have devel-
oped exceptions to the employee-at-will doctrine under contract and
tort theories, including implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
tortious interference with contract, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, invasion of privacy, fraud, and defamation.20 2
Common-law alternatives provide several advantages for plaintiffs.
First, common-law theories may allow recovery of compensatory and
punitive damages. 208 Second, jury trials are usually available for com-
mon-law claims.2 0 4 Third, the statutes of limitations for common-law
claims generally exceed those found in Title VII and state employment
discrimination statutes.20 5 Finally, plaintiffs seeking recovery under
common-law theories generally are not bound by administrative proce-
dural requirements and instead can proceed directly to court.206 Federal
employment discrimination law does not preempt common-law claims,
and plaintiffs may join common-law and federal statutory claims in one
action. 7 Some state statutes, however, are exclusive remedies and bar
200. One commentator observes that some state courts have rejected restrictive rulings of the
Supreme Court when applying state statutes. See Belton, supra note 160, at 256.
201. The employee-at-will doctrine holds that when an employer hires an employee for an
indefinite period "either party may terminate the employment relationship at any time with or
without. cause or notices in the absence of a limiting statute or agreement of the parties." Morris &
Gray, Current Developments in Wrongful Discharge, in 1 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AND CIVIL
RIGHTS ACTIONS IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS [an ALI-ABA Course of Study] 5 (1990).
202. A comprehensive survey of the development of common-law alternatives to state and
federal employment discrimination statutes is beyond the scope of this Note. For materials ad-
dressing this topic in detail, see C. RICHEY, MANUAL ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW AND
CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS I-1 to 1-43 (rev. ed. 1988); B. ScHLEI & P. GROSSMAN,
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 743-70 (2d ed. 1983); Morris & Gray, supra note 201; Green-
baum, Toward a Common Law of Employment Discrimination, 58 TEMP. L.Q. 65 (1985); Wald,
Alternatives to Title VII: State Statutory and Common-Law Remedies for Employment Discrim-
ination, 36 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 35 (1982); Note, Reversing the Presumption of Employment at
Will, 44 VAND. L. REV. 691 (1991).
203. C. RICHEY, supra note 202, at 1-4.
204. Id. at 1-4 to 1-5.
205. Id. at 1-5.
206. Arterton, supra note 15, at 503.
207. Jones v. Intermountain Power Project, 794 F.2d 546, 552-53 (10th Cir. 1986). Whether
federal courts will exercise pendent jurisdiction over such claims, however, is uncertain. The lower
federal courts have split on the propriety of exercising pendent jurisdiction over state common-law
claims joined to Title VII claims. See infra notes 300-01 and accompanying text.
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recovery under state common-law theories when state statutes also
apply.208
State employment discrimination law now offers many plaintiffs a
myriad of statutory and common-law alternatives to traditional federal
remedies. If state law provides broader rights and remedies than those
available under federal law, a plaintiff's preference for the state forum
may be strengthened. Nevertheless, preserving the choice of a state fo-
rum may come at the cost of abandoning federal claims to prevent re-
moval; thus, plaintiffs must consider carefully whether the desired
outcome is more likely under state or federal law. For this reason a
thorough evaluation and comparison of current state and federal law, as
well as the receptivity of the respective judiciaries to that law, will be
an important part of the forum selection process.
3. Procedural Advantages and Disadvantages
One last factor employment discrimination litigants must consider
in evaluating the state forum is the possibility that procedural advan-
tages or disadvantages may inhere with the choice of the state forum.
Assuming that they have met administrative procedural require-
ments,0 9 plaintiffs selecting state courts still may confront procedural
208. Several courts have held that the availability of state statutes precludes recovery under
common-law claims arising from the same discriminatory acts. See, e.g., Chappell v. Southern Md.
Hosp., 320 Md. 483, 578 A.2d 766 (1990); Crews v. Memorex Corp., 588 F. Supp. 27 (D. Mass.
1984); see also supra note 194 and accompanying text.
209. This Note addresses forum selection in the context of litigation, therefore, it does not
discuss the prelitigation administrative procedures required by Title VII and many state statutes.
Briefly, Title VII requires that complainants file their complaints with the EEOC within 180 days
of an alleged discriminatory act if there is no comparable approved state or local agency. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(e) (1988). In states that have approved fair employment practices (FEP) agencies, the
complainant must file the charge with that agency within the state's time requirement. Id. § 2000e-
5(c). The complainant then cannot fie a claim with the EEOC for 60 days after filing with the
state agency. Id. In these states, the complainant must have fied with the EEOC within 300 days
of the discriminatory act or within 30 days after the receipt of notice that the state agency has
terminated proceedings, whichever is earlier. Id. § 2000e-5(e). If within 180 days of receiving a
complaint the EEOC either has failed to bring an action or has dismissed the claim, the EEOC will
issue the complainant a right-to-sue letter. Within 90 days of receiving this notice, the complain-
ant must file a complaint in the court of choice or he will waive the right to sue. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
A complete survey of the administrative practices and requirements of the various states is
beyond the scope of this Note. In summary, however, state administrative requirements typically
take one of three forms. Some states require complete exhaustion of state administrative remedies
before a complainant may proceed with state claims in state court. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §§ 45-
19-36 to 45-19-39 (1990); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, para. 1-101, 7-102, 8-103 (Smith-Hurd 1989). Some
states require that complainants begin by filing a charge with the appropriate state agency and
permit the complainant to bring suit if the agency has not taken action within a specified time or
has dismissed the claim. See, e.g., MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 151B, §§ 5, 9 (Law. Co-op. 1982 & Supp.
1990); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 962(c) (Supp. 1990). Finally, some states do not require plaintiffs to
pursue administrative remedies prior to filing suit. See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.2801-03
(West 1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-13 (West Supp. 1990); N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 297 (McKinney 1982
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hurdles. In some cases, these hurdles will mitigate against the selection
of a state forum.
The primary procedural disadvantage to plaintiffs selecting a state
forum is removal. Under the federal removal statute, defendants gener-
ally may remove to federal district court any case in which the plaintiff
asserts a federal claim.2 10 Plaintiffs asserting claims under Title VII or
other federal statutes in state court, therefore, risk having the whole
case-including state as well as federal claims-removed to federal
court.2 1 ' Nevertheless, because the federal court's jurisdiction over pen-
dent state claims is discretionary, the district judge may remand the
state claims and retain only the Title VII claims.2 12
If the district court remands state claims, plaintiffs who choose to
proceed in separate forums risk losing the claim first litigated and then
having the second claim barred by issue preclusion rules. 213 The other
alternative for plaintiffs is simply to abandon one of the claims.2 4
Plaintiffs who select state court after concluding that it is more likely to
produce the desired outcome probably will abandon federal claims. Al-
though a decision to abandon federal claims will leave plaintiffs in es-
sentially the same position of having filed only state claims initially,
much time, energy, and money may be wasted in the process.2 15
If the district court exercises jurisdiction over the pendent claims,
plaintiffs face much the same choice. Either they must abandon the
federal claims to have the state claims remanded to state court or they
must proceed with all claims in federal court. Again, plaintiffs with a
strong preference for state court probably will abandon the federal
claims.21 6 Although defendants may choose not to remove, plaintiffs can
guarantee their choice of a state forum from the outset only by aban-
doning federal claims. Thus, if a plaintiff determines that a state forum
is more likely to produce a favorable outcome, the plaintiff should con-
sider foregoing federal claims at the beginning of the suit.
Other procedural problems may inhere in the choice of a state fo-
& Supp. 1991). Litigants should examine local statutes and case law to determine which, if any,
exhaustion requirements state law imposes.
For a general discussion of the various federal and state administrative prerequisites to filing
suit, see Catania, supra note 160, at 818-32.
210. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1988).
211. See id.
212. See infra notes 300-02 and accompanying text.
213. Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 485 (1982).
214. See Mishkind & Burns, supra note 61, at 260-61 (suggesting that when defendants re-
move Title VII and joined state claims from state to federal court some "plaintiffs will abandon
their Title VII claim in order to defeat federal jurisdiction").
215. See id. (observing that removal of Title VII and joined state claims will raise issues of
pendent jurisdiction and "will engender additional motion practice and costs").
216. Id.
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rum as well. Attorneys generally agree that many state courts are ill-
equipped to handle the complexities of large class actions.217 Employ-
ment discrimination plaintiffs who wish to pursue remedies as a class,
therefore, must evaluate carefully the state courts' ability to handle
class actions effectively.2 18 Plaintiffs also may encounter more restric-
tive discovery rules in state court219 and then must weigh the need for
liberal discovery against the preference for the state forum. Other po-
tential hurdles plaintiffs should consider are the state's evidentiary
rules, pleading requirements, and any other procedures that may affect
outcome.220 One procedural advantage that may accompany the choice
of the state forum, however, is the more stringent summary judgment
standard often found in state courts.221
Despite the procedural difficulties that may accompany state court
proceedings, mere inconvenience should not defeat litigants' choice of a
state forum when that forum clearly presents the best chance to achieve
the desired outcome. Only when procedure risks defeating a favorable
outcome should litigants surrender a clear choice of forum. When, how-
ever, the federal and state forums appear to provide roughly equal op-
portunities for recovery, potential procedural problems may become a
deciding factor.222
B. Evaluating the Federal Forum
1. Competence, Receptivity, and Bias in the Federal Judiciary
The traditional plaintiff preference for federal courts in employ-
ment discrimination litigation is largely due to perceptions of the fed-
eral judiciary's greater expertise and receptivity.223 Even those who
217. See Arterton, supra note 15, at 504-05; Neuborne, supra note 73, at 740-42; Saperstein,
supra note 161, at 512.
218. See Saperstein, supra note 161, at 512 (generally advocating use of state courts and
state claims in employment discrimination suits but noting that "[c]hoosing between state and
federal court in a major class action is a much closer question").
219. Arterton, supra note 15, at 505 (observing that "extensive discovery needs of discrimi-
nation plaintiffs are more likely to be met adequately by a federal district judge applying federal
rules than by more restrictive state courts").
220. See generally Neuborne, supra note 73, at 733-47 (discussing potential procedural infer-
iorities of state courts).
221. Recent Supreme Court decisions have made it much easier for defendants to prevail on
summary judgment motions in federal court. See infra notes 296-99 and accompanying text. In
state courts, however, defendants moving for summary judgment generally face stringent tests.
Mishkind & Burns, supra note 61, at 261.
222. See Neuborne, supra note 73, at 733 n.23 (noting that "a lawyer is unlikely to be di-
verted from the substantively superior forum by procedural concerns, unless they act as door-
closing devices," and that when forums appear "roughly equivalent, differences in procedure will
exert the strongest influence on choice of forum").
223. See Belton, supra note 160, at 255 (suggesting that the traditional preference for federal
courts stems from fears that state courts "would not be sympathetic to the enforcement of federal
1991]
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argue that state courts provide equally amenable forums for those seek-
ing vindication of federal rights do not dispute the general expertise
and receptivity of the federal judiciary.224 Nevertheless, the developing
role of state courts and state law in the area of employment discrimina-
tion indicates that these perceptions are changing. Because competence,
receptivity, and bias potentially may determine the outcome of litiga-
tion, employment discrimination litigants must consider the extent to
which traditional assumptions of expertise and receptivity still apply to
federal forums.
Of these factors, the expertise of the federal judiciary in employ-
ment discrimination matters is certainly the area least assailable. The
federal courts generally are well versed in employment discrimination
law22' 5 and are likely to remain so because of their frequent exposure to
employment discrimination litigation.228 This experience assures liti-
gants that federal courts are familiar with the legal questions and un-
derlying policies likely to be at issue under either federal or state law.2 27
Of course, the experience of individual courts may vary, and litigants
still must investigate the particular courts to which they have access to
discover potentially outcome-affecting deviations from the norm.228
Commentators disagree about the continued significance of past cy-
cles in the receptivity of the federal courts to civil rights issues.229 Nev-
ertheless, they acknowledge that the federal courts, like the nation
itself, have both contracted and expanded civil rights at different points
rights" and the "perceived notion that the 'quality of justice' in federal courts was substantially
superior to the 'quality of justice' in state courts").
224. The argument of parity proponents is that state courts are equally capable of protecting
and enforcing federal rights as their federal counterparts, not that they are equally inadequate.
See supra notes 95-114 and accompanying text.
225. See Yellow Freight System, Inc. v. Donnelly, 110 S. Ct. 1566, 1570 (1990) (recognizing
the experience of federal courts in Title VII matters).
226. See Shapiro, Using State Civil Rights Statutes in Federal Civil Rights Litigation, 35
FED. B. Naws & J. 113, 113 (1988) (noting that "[t]he most common civil rights cases in federal
courts today are those involving claims of employment discrimination"). Whether, in light of the
Yellow Freight decision, the steady stream of employment discrimination cases into federal court
will abate significantly remains to be seen.
227. Because the same policies underlie Title VII and state statutes and because many state
statutes closely resemble Title VII, federal courts are unquestionably familiar with the legal issues
and policies. Furthermore, because under pendent jurisdiction rules federal courts should remand
novel questions of state law, they may avoid issues in which they are inexperienced. See infra
notes 300-02 and accompanying text (discussing federal courts' exercise of pendent jurisdiction
over state claims).
228. Newly seated district court judges, for example, may lack experience in employment
discrimination matters. Nevertheless, the availability of the vast body of federal precedent to guide
the court as well as the corrective mechanism of the appellate courts may compensate for the lack
of hands-on experience.
229. See generally supra note 98.
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in history.230 The post-Reconstruction era, for example, remains a pe-
riod noted for federal courts' failure to uphold the rights of racial mi-
norities. 23 1 Some commentators suggest that the federal courts recently
have entered an era similar in temper to that of the post-Reconstruc-
tion period in the area of employment discrimination law.2 2 These
commentators question assumptions about the continuing receptivity of
the federal courts to employment discrimination plaintiffs and their
claims.233
Employment discrimination plaintiffs considering a federal forum
must be concerned greatly about the recent trend toward a more con-
servative federal judiciary and the potential effect of that trend on the
receptivity and bias of the federal courts.34 Both parity skeptics and
believers agree that the insulation of the federal judiciary from the elec-
toral process affords them desirable insulation from majoritarian pres-
sure. 2 5 Insulation from political pressure, however, cannot be equated
with insulation from politics. Although federal judges may be able to
divorce themselves from the public, they are less likely to divorce them-
selves from personal political and judicial philosophies.3 6
During the 1980s, the federal judiciary underwent a radical change
in composition.3 7 President Reagan's conservative political agenda em-
230. See Bator, supra note 7, at 632 n.64 (noting "cruelties inflicted on individuals by the
federal government and solemnly legitimized by the Supreme Court in the 1940's and early
1950's"); Neuborne, supra note 7, at 1106-15 (discussing historical cycles in the sympathies of the
federal and state courts); see also Note, Reconstruction, Deconstruction, and Legislative Re-
sponse: The 1988 Supreme Court Term and the Civil Rights Act of 1990, 25 HARV. C.R-CL. L.
REv. 475, 478-508 (1990) (charting uneven history of Congress and the federal courts in protecting
and enforcing federal rights).
231. See Belton, supra note 160, at 246-47; Neuborne, supra note 7, at 1114-15; Ralston,
Court vs. Congress: Judicial Interpretation of the Civil Rights Acts and Congressional Response,
8 YALE L. & POL'y REV. 205, 207 (1990); Note, supra note 230, at 486-93.
232. Commentators base such arguments on current trends in federal judicial decision mak-
ing. See Belton, supra note 160, at 248-49; Note, supra note 230, at 504.
233. See Belton, supra note 160, at 247 (observing that through decisions of the 1988 Term
"the Court has played a pivotal role in halting promising developments in eliminating discrimina-
tion"); Note, supra note 230, at 508 (noting that unless Congress acts, the decisions of the 1988
Term could result in "a reversion to a period of court-supported practices of discrimination under
the reinterpreted laws").
234. See infra notes 237-41 and accompanying text.
235. See supra note 151.
236. Indeed, presidents generally try to select judicial candidates that espouse ideologies
compatible with their own. See Chemerinsky, supra note 152, at 1990 (observing that "[i]t is no
accident that virtually every president in history has selected judicial nominees who shared the
incumbent administration's basic political beliefs").
237. Levit, The Caseload Conundrum, Constitutional Restraint and the Manipulation of
Jurisdiction, 64 NorE DAmE L. REV. 321, 321 n.3 (1989) (noting that "[b]y November of 1988,
[President Reagan] had installed 79 judges on appellate courts and 272 judges on district
courts-more than 48 percent of all federal judges"). Reagan also elevated Chief Justice William
Rehnquist to the leadership of the Court and appointed three Associate Justices to the Supreme
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phasized the reduction of governmental control in many aspects of soci-
ety and included the halt and reversal of recent expansions in
employment discrimination law rights and remedies."8 Several com-
mentators have suggested that this agenda has caused the federal judi-
ciary to become increasingly conservative.3s Two manifestations of this
growing conservatism are an apparent decrease in the receptivity of the
federal courts to employment discrimination issues and a concomitant
contraction of federal employment discrimination law. Although liti-
gants will encounter these manifestations to varying degrees in different
federal courts, 24 0 even individual members of the judiciary who remain
sensitive and sympathetic to the claims of employment discrimination
litigants cannot insulate themselves from the dictates of the Supreme
Court. The Court's spate of restrictive rulings during the 1988 Term,24 '
has diminished the ability of even traditionally receptive federal judges
to accommodate employment discrimination plaintiffs. Thus, although
the federal judiciary remains insulated from majoritarian pressures, po-
litical agenda-setting still may exert some influence on the receptivity
of the federal courts.
In evaluating the federal forum, employment discrimination liti-
gants should consider the potential effect of the federal judiciary's new
conservatism on the outcome of a given case on two levels. First, a liti-
gant must assess the degree to which federal courts can be receptive to
the litigant's claim in light of recent Supreme Court and lower federal
court rulings. Second, the litigant must assess the degree of receptivity
the specific, available courts are likely to exercise. Thus, to use the fo-
rum selection process to its best advantage, litigants should evaluate
both an individual court's ability and its willingness to provide the de-
sired outcome. Litigants cannot rely exclusively on judicial trends, but
should evaluate federal forums on a case-specific basis and from an out-
come-oriented perspective.
Court: Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, Justice Antonin Scalia, and Justice Anthony Kennedy.
238. See Note, supra note 230, at 501-04 (summarizing the Reagan agenda in the area of civil
rights).
239. A plethora of books and articles discuss the increased conservatism of the federal judici-
ary during the Reagan administration. See, e.g., H. SCHWARTZ, PACKING THE COURTS: THE CON-
SERVATIVE CAMPAIGN TO REWRITE THE CONSTITUTION (1988); Coyle, The Judiciary: A Great Right
Hope, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 18, 1988, at 22; Gottschall, Reagan's Appointments to the U.S. Courts of
Appeals: The Continuation of a Judicial Revolution, 70 JUDICATURE 48 (1986).
240. Despite the perceived overall conservatism of the federal judiciary, some lower federal
courts' rulings seem anything but conservative. In Alabama, for example, District Judge William
Acker recently has held that Title VII plaintiffs are entitled to jury trials. See Walker v. Anderson
Elec. Connectors, 736 F. Supp. 253 (N.D. Ala. 1990); Walton v. Cowin Equip. Co., 733 F. Supp. 327
(N.D. Ala. 1990); Beesley v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 723 F. Supp. 635 and 717 F. Supp. 781 (N.D.
Ala. 1989).
241. See infra notes 257-89 and accompanying text.
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2. The Contraction of Federal Claims
The degree to which federal law dominates the outcome of a partic-
ular case may create a presumption favoring the selection of federal
court. Plaintiffs must compare the desired result with the potential out-
come under federal and state law to determine which offers the rights
and remedies that better protect and compensate the plaintiff. Even
with its recent contraction in certain areas, federal law still may provide
an employment discrimination plaintiff the better chance of success.
Of the various provisions of federal law available to employment
discrimination plaintiffs, 242 Title VII is the most accessible and, there-
fore, is the most significant.243 Briefly, Title VII prohibits discrimina-
tion based upon race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.244 Title VII
generally applies to employers of fifteen or more employees, employ-
ment agencies, and labor organizations.245 Title VII prohibits discrimi-
natory treatment in hiring, firing, compensation, promotion, and other
employment decisions regarding the terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment.24 1
Seeking recovery under Title VII may be advantageous to victims
of employment discrimination for several reasons. First, Title VII pro-
vides a uniform body of well-established law and thus a guaranteed
242. In addition to Title VII, several other federal statutes offer significant protection to
victims of employment discrimination in various circumstances. The Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (1988), prohibits discrimination based on race, color, or ethnicity in the making and
enforcing of contracts and allows plaintiffs to seek recovery of compensatory and punitive dam-
ages. See Johnson v. Railway Express, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975) (dictum). Recently, however,
the Supreme Court has limited severely the application of this statute in the area of employment
discrimination. See the discussion infra at notes 283-89 and accompanying text. The Civil Rights
Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988), prohibits discriminatory treatment under color of state law or
local law, thus protecting employees from discriminatory state action. Section 1983 allows recovery
of compensatory and punitive damages. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983); Carey v.
Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 255-57 (1978). Both § 1981 and § 1983 require plaintiffs to show intentional
discrimination. See General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (1982); Wash-
ington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
More recent federal enactments specifically directed at employment discrimination include
the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988) (prohibiting gender-based wage discrimina-
tion); the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, id. §§ 621-634 (prohibiting age-based
discriminatory employment practices by employers of 20 or more employees, employment agencies,
and labor organizations); and Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.A. §§
12, 111-112, 117 (West Supp. Dec. 1990) (prohibiting employment practices that discriminate
against qualified disabled individuals and providing the same remedies as Title VII).
243. See Wald, supra note 202, at 36 n.8 (commenting that "Title VII is crucial to a long
range battle against employment discrimination because it alone, of all [federal] remedies cur-
rently available, is geared to redress systematic, class-wide discrimination, with an emphasis on the
effect of a discriminatory practice rather than the intent of an employer").
244. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988).
245. Id. §§ 2000e(b), 2000e-2(a)-(c).
246. Id. § 2000e-2(a)-(d).
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floor of protection to those falling under its auspices. Second, Title VII
requires the use of a conciliation process to encourage the settlement of
disputes without litigation. 47 Third, Title VII enables employees to
seek redress for discriminatory treatment under two distinct theories:
disparate treatment248 and disparate impact.249 Fourth, Title VII ex-
pressly provides for a variety of equitable relief including reinstatement
and back pay, as well as attorney's fees.2 50 Finally, Title VII's theories
of recovery facilitate the pursuit of recovery as a class.2 51
Nevertheless, Title VII has certain inherent disadvantages that, in
some cases, may lessen its effectiveness in redressing the rights of vic-
tims of employment discrimination. First, Title VII does not apply to
employers of fewer than fifteen workers.252 Second, Title VII may not
compensate victims of discrimination completely, because it provides
only equitable relief, not compensatory or punitive damages.253 Third,
due to the equitable nature of the relief granted under Title VII, Title
VII denies litigants the opportunity for a jury trial.2 ' Furthermore, al-
though other federal statutes may supplement Title VII, these statutes
247. Id. § 2000e-5(c)-(f).
248. Under the disparate treatment theory, the plaintiff must prove an intentional act of
discrimination on the part of the employer. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973).
249. Under the disparate impact theory, an employer is liable for the employment practices
that have a discriminatory impact upon a protected group when the employer had knowledge of
reasonable alternatives to those practices. The Court first set out the test for disparate impact in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), but recently redefined the disparate impact theory
and made proving disparate impact more difficult for the plaintiff in Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989). See infra notes 263-75 and accompanying text.
250. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), (k) (1988).
251. See Wald, supra note 202, at 38 (suggesting that Title VII class actions are "a particu-
larly appropriate vehicle in cases in which discrimination results from the disparate impact of a
general employment policy, rather than from actions aimed at specific employees").
252. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988).
253. Because the remedies enumerated in § 2000e-5(g) are equitable in nature, courts con-
sistently have found that compensatory and punitive damages are not available to Title VII plain-
tiffs. See, e.g., Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 374-76 (1979) (dictum);
Protos v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 797 F.2d 129, 138 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 972 (1986);
Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 905 (11th Cir. 1982); Shah v. Mt. Zion Hosp. & Medical Center,
642 F.2d 268, 272 (9th Cir. 1981); DeGrace v. Rumsfield, 614 F.2d 796, 808 (1st Cir. 1980).
254. Although the Supreme Court has yet to rule on the availability of jury trials in Title VII
cases, the circuit courts addressing the issue have agreed that jury trials are not available to Title
VII litigants. See, e.g., Shah, 642 F.2d at 272; Grayson v. Wickes Corp., 607 F.2d 1194, 1196 (7th
Cir. 1979); Harmon v. May Broadcast Co., 583 F.2d 410, 410-11 (8th Cir. 1978); Slack v. Havens,
522 F.2d 1091, 1094 (9th Cir. 1975); EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301, 308 (6th Cir. 1975);
Robinson v. Lorrilard Corp., 444 F.2d 691, 802 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971);
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1125 (5th Cir. 1969). Recently, however,
Judge William Acker of the Northern District of Alabama has rejected this view and granted jury
trials to Title VII litigants. See supra note 240. For a history and general discussion of jury trials
and Title VII, see Comment, Beyond the Dicta: The Seventh Amendment Right to Trial by Jury
Under Title VII, 38 KAN. L. REv. 1003 (1990).
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are not without their own limitations.2 5 5 In the end, Title VII remains
the most effective federal remedy for victims of private employment
discrimination.256
Despite the initial importance of federal statutes, particularly Title
VII, in combating the causes and effects of employment discrimination,
several recent Supreme Court decisions challenge the continued efficacy
of federal remedies and receptivity of the federal courts to employment
discrimination claims. During its 1988 Term, the Supreme Court
handed down seven decisions that signaled a turnabout in the Court's
willingness to extend federal protection to victims of employment dis-
crimination and severely contracted the availability and breadth of fed-
eral remedies.
In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,257 the first of these cases, the
Court addressed the issue of burden of proof in Title VII mixed-motive
cases.2 58 A plurality of the Court held that once a plaintiff proves that
an impermissible motive influenced an employer's decision in a mixed-
motive case, the burden of proof shifts to the employer. The employer,
however, still can escape liability by showing that legitimate business
concerns also were factors in the employer's decision.2 59 Critics of the
Court's decision maintain that allowing employers who have considered
improper motives in making employment decisions to escape full liabil-
ity undercuts the deterrence policy underlying Title VII.260 Allowing the
employee partial relief, rather than allowing the employer to escape full
liability, would fulfill the deterrence policy more effectively. 261 Thus, al-
though the burden-shifting framework established in Price Waterhouse
favors plaintiffs, the decision is a mixed blessing because it also signals
255. See supra note 242.
256. See Catania, supra note 160, at 782 (noting that "[T]itle VII probably is the most fre-
quently invoked protective mechanism in employment discrimination litigation").
257. 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989) (plurality decision).
258. A mixed-motive Title VII case is one in which the employer has made employment
"decisions based on a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate considerations." Id. at 1785. Before
Price Waterhouse, lower courts were split on who carried the burden of proof in a mixed-motive
case and what standard of proof was required. Id. at 1784 n.2 (summarizing the wide variety of
opinions among the circuits).
259. Id. at 1795. The lower court had held that if the employer shows that he would have
made the same decision without considering the impermissible motive, the employer could avoid
equitable relief, but not costs and attorney's fees. The D.C. Circuit held that if the employer met a.
clear and convincing standard of proof the employer could avoid full liability. Id. at 1783-84.
260. See Note, supra note 230, at 532 (arguing that the Court's decision allows employers "to
continue their discriminatory practices with little more than a slap on the wrist," but leaves plain-
tiffs "empty-handed, unable to recover even attorney's fees or litigation expenses from a proven
wrongdoer").
261. Id. at 536 (arguing that "failure to correct Price-Waterhouse could severely dampen the
enthusiasm of civil rights lawyers and plaintiffs to initiate mixed-motive cases").
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a lack of sensitivity to the policies underlying Title VII.2 62
One month later, in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,263 the
Court delivered Title VII litigants a far more crushing blow by striking
down interpretations of a 1971 case, Griggs v. Duke Power Co.2 6 4 In
Griggs the Court had ruled that Title VII prohibited an employer's pol-
icies that had a disparate impact on minorities, even in the absence of
discriminatory intent. e5 Job-related policies, however, were excluded
from this ruling.2"6 Lower courts had interpreted this decision as plac-
ing the burden of proving job-relatedness on the employer after the em-
ployee's prima facie showing that the practice caused a disparate
impact.2 67 Because Griggs allowed minorities to attack practices that re-
sulted in discrimination in fact without having to prove an actual intent
to discriminate, Griggs became an important vehicle for fulfilling the
goals of Title VII.26s
The Court rejected the popular interpretation of Griggs in Wards
Cove, holding that after the initial showing of disparate impact, only a
burden of production shifts to the employer-defendant. To overcome
the showing of disparate impact, the employer need only produce evi-
dence that the questioned practice is necessary to the employer's busi-
ness. The plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion.2 69 If the employer
presents evidence of business necessity, the plaintiff then must prove
that less discriminatory alternatives existed of which the employer was
aware but refused to adopt.2 7 0 Furthermore, the Court held that estab-
lishing even a prima facie disparate impact case requires the plaintiff to
present statistical evidence linking specific practices to specific dispari-
ties in the employer's work force.2 7
Wards Cove has engendered much criticism.272 Not only has the
Court's redefinition of the disparate impact theory made pleading and
262. Id. at 531-32.
263. 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
264. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
265. Id. at 431.
266. Id.
267. See Note, supra note 230, at 520.
268. Id. at 499 (noting that Griggs has been of great importance in making the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 an effective remedy for discrimination); Belton, supra note 160, at 225 (observing that
"[o]f the more than 100 employment discrimination cases decided by the Supreme Court since the
passage of Title VII in 1964, [Griggs] has been the most important in eliminating employment
discrimination").
269. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2126. Nor did the business practice in question have to be
"'essential' or 'indispensable' to the employer's business." Id. "[E]vidence of a business justifica-
tion" was enough for the employer to carry his burden. Id.
270. Id. at 2126-27.
271. Id. at 2124-25.
272. See, e.g., Belton, supra note 160, at 244-49; Ralston, supra note 231, at 212-13; Note,
supra note 230, at 517-21.
[Vol. 44:641
FORUM SELECTION
proving claims much more difficult,2"73 it also may give employers an
easy escape at the end of a losing case. Because plaintiffs must show
reasonable, but known and unadopted, alternatives to the employers'
practices, employers may be able to delay adoption of the alternatives
until after a plaintiff makes a successful showing of their existence dur-
ing the litigation, thereby mooting a losing case.27" If this result de-
prives plaintiffs of a recovery after long and costly litigation, it will
deter future potential plaintiffs from pursuing valid claims against their
employers.2 5
In the weeks following Wards Cove, the Court issued three deci-
sions that further diluted the protections afforded plaintiffs under Title
VII. In Martin v. Wilks27 ' the Court held that a group of white
firefighters claiming reverse discrimination could attack collaterally an
affirmative action plan approved by the district court even though the
white firefighters had notice and an unexercised opportunity to inter-
vene in the prior Title VII suit.2 77 In Lorance v. AT&T Technologies278
the Court found that the statute of limitations had run on a Title VII
suit challenging the employer's seniority system as sexually discrimina-
tory by holding that the statute ran from the date that the employer
adopted the seniority system, not from the date the system adversely
affected the plaintiffs.27  Finally, in Independent Federation of Flight
Attendants v. Zipes280 the Court held that plaintiffs could not recover
attorney's fees from unsuccessful intervenors in a Title VII suit unless
the intervention was "frivolous, unreasonable, or without
foundation." 281
Title VII claims were not the only employment discrimination cas-
ualties of the 1988 Term. The Court also narrowed the scope of section
1981.282 In Patterson v. McLean Credit Union2 83 the Court held that
section 1981 did not protect against discriminatory conduct that arose
after contract formation. Prior to Patterson, decisions of the Court had
supported broader readings of section 1981.84 For example, the statute
273. Belton, supra note 160, at 240-41.
274. Note, supra note 230, at 521. Defendants presumably must learn of the alternatives
because plaintiffs have to show the reasonable alternative during the trial to rebut the business
justification defense. Id.
275. Id. (noting that "chilling of Title VII claims is inescapable").
276. 109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989).
277. Id. at 2185-88.
278. 109 S. Ct. 2261 (1989).
279. Id. at 2265, 2267.
280. 109 S. Ct. 2732 (1989).
281. Id. at 2736.
282. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988).
283. 109 S. Ct. 2263 (1989).
284. See, e.g., Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 661-62 (1987) (observing in dicta
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had provided victims of racial harassment the possibility of full com-
pensatory and punitive damages and other remedies unavailable under
Title VII.2 85 Because many section 1981 plaintiffs were victims of racial
harassment in a continuing employment relationship, the traditional
Title VII remedies of back pay and injunctive relief were inadequate. 6
Patterson severely limited the types of relief available to victims of ra-
cial harassment. A week later, in Jett v. Dallas Independent School
District,2s7 the Court held that section 1981 did not reach discrimina-
tory acts of local governments. 88 In combination, Patterson and Jett
have reduced drastically the availability of section 1981 as a weapon
against employment discrimination.8
Employment discrimination litigants engaging in the forum selec-
tion process are affected by the decisions of the 1988 Term in two ways.
First, and most obviously, the decisions have limited substantially the
rights and remedies available to employment discrimination plaintiffs
under federal law. Narrowing federal statutes makes pleading and prov-
ing claims more difficult for plaintiffs and concomitantly relaxes the
burden on employers to justify their actions. The Court not only has
made federal roads of redress less accessible to victims of employment
discrimination, but also more difficult for them to travel. Litigants must
consider these developments when weighing the relative importance of
state and federal claims to the desired outcome. Second, by narrowly
reading both Title VII and section 1981, the Court has indicated that it
will be less receptive to employment discrimination claims and plain-
tiffs than in the past. When evaluating the federal forum, employment
discrimination litigants must consider that this new temperament is
likely to influence the receptivity of the lower federal courts as well.290
To the extent that these decisions reflect the trend toward a more con-
servative federal judiciary, and a related trend toward a narrower read-
that "Section 1981 has a much broader focus than contractual rights ... guaranteeing the per-
sonal right to engage in economically significant activity free from racially discriminatory
interference").
285. Note, supra note 230, at 510-11.
286. Id.
287. 109 S. Ct. 2702 (1989).
288. Id. at 2720-22.
289. See Ralston, supra note 231, at 216 (stating that after Patterson and Jett § 1981 covers
"virtually nothing in the area of employment discrimination").
290. These decisions, of course, remain susceptible to congressional reversal. In the proposed
Civil Rights Act of 1990 Congress addressed many of the setbacks suffered by employment dis-
crimination plaintiffs in the 1988 Term. Although the Act passed both houses of Congress, Presi-
dent Bush vetoed the Act, and an attempt to override the veto failed. See Note, The Defeat of the
Civil Rights Act of 1990: Wading Through the Rhetoric in Search of Compromise, 44 VAND. L.
REV. 597 (1991). Plaintiffs should watch for future legislative attempts to reverse some or all of
these decisions.
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ing of federal employment discrimination law, they will continue to be
an important indicator of the potential outcome in the federal forum.
3. Procedural Advantages and Disadvantages
As in the evaluation of the state forum, litigants considering a fed-
eral forum should contemplate any procedural advantages or disadvan-
tages that may inhere in the forum choice. Professor Neuborne suggests
that the uniform body of procedural rules and the predictability that
those rules inject into federal court litigation make the federal judiciary
a more litigant-friendly forum than its state counterparts."' Certain
basic procedural advantages that often accompany the choice of a fed-
eral forum may be of special importance to employment discrimination
litigants.
One significant advantage that federal procedure offers plaintiffs is
its liberal discovery policy.2 92 Because employment discrimination is
often difficult to prove, access to information in the employer's control
may be essential to a plaintiff's case. Discovery is especially important
in disparate impact cases in which plaintiffs will have to present statis-
tical data only available in the employer's records."' Liberal pleading
requirements and evidentiary rules also contribute to the desirability of
federal forums.29 The recognized superiority of federal class action pro-
cedure and the federal judiciary's experience in managing the complexi-
ties of large class actions also are undoubted advantages for plaintiffs
interested in pursuing relief as a class.29 5
Despite this user-friendly reputation of the federal courts, recent
developments in federal procedural law suggest that the courts are less
friendly than they once were to certain classes of claims and plain-
tiffs.2 98 One of the manifestations of a new federal procedural philoso-
phy is the expanding use of summary judgment to dispose of cases. 29 7
291. Neuborne, supra note 73, at 733-47.
292. Id. at 745-46; see also supra note 219.
293. Because Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989), places an even
greater burden on the plaintiff in gathering statistical evidence, the need for liberal discovery is
greater than ever. See supra notes 272-75 and accompanying text. Interestingly, in Wards Cove
the Court rejected arguments that its holding was "unduly burdensome on Title VII plaintiffs"
because liberal federal discovery rules "give plaintiffs broad access to employers' records in an
effort to document their claims." Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2125. In light of Yellow Freight, this
reasoning seems less persuasive because liberal discovery may not be available in many state
courts.
294. See Neuborne, supra note 73, at 737-39.
295. See supra notes 217-18 and accompanying text.
296. See Levit, supra note 237, at 321 (arguing that a "combination of judicial overload and
injudicious federalism [practiced by recent appointees to the federal bench] is operating to shunt
certain classes of litigants away from federal courts").
297. Id. at 327-30. In 1986 the Court issued three opinions establishing the Court's new posi-
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Under this new philosophy, summary judgment no longer appears to be
a disfavored procedure, even when cases present fact-intensive ques-
tions such as that of intent. 98 Thus, new attitudes toward summary
judgment procedures could prove particularly costly to plaintiffs in tra-
ditionally fact-driven employment discrimination suits. 299
Another procedural obstacle plaintiffs may face in choosing a fed-
eral forum is the possibility that the court will not allow joinder of state
claims. Some lower federal courts have used pendent jurisdiction rules
to prevent plaintiffs from presenting state employment discrimination
claims in conjunction with Title VII claims when the state claims allow
jury trials or more expansive remedies than Title VII °00 Now that
plaintiffs may present Title VII claims in state court, some federal
courts may be even less receptive to pendent state claims.30 1 Because
tion on summary judgment. In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254 (1986), the
Court held that the courts should consider the evidentiary standard plaintiffs must meet at trial in
considering whether summary judgment is appropriate. Not only does the decision make it harder
for plaintiffs to survive a summary judgment motion by demanding a higher standard of proof at
an early stage, but, as Levit observes, it "reflects a willingness to view summary judgment favora-
bly, even when the primary issue is state of mind." Levit, supra note 237, at 327. In Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), the Court held that a summary judgment movant need not "sup-
port its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent's claim," but
rather could point merely "to an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Id.
at 323, 325. In addition, the Court expressly stated that summary judgment was not a "disfavored
procedural shortcut." Id. at 327. Finally, in Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 587-88 (1986), the Court again emphasized the liberalization of summary judgment
procedures.
298. See supra note 297.
299. See Mishkind & Burns, supra note 61, at 261 (suggesting that the Court's 1986 "sum-
mary judgment Trilogy" makes increased possibility of summary judgment in federal court an
important factor when Title VII plaintiffs choose a forum).
300. See, e.g., Monegon v. Shellcraft Indus., 590 F. Supp. 956 (D. Vt. 1984); Frye v. Pioneer
Mach., 555 F. Supp. 730 (D.S.C. 1983); Bennett v. Southern Marine Management Co., 530 F. Supp.
115 (M.D. Fla. 1982); Jong-Yul Lim v. International Inst., 510 F. Supp. 722 (E.D. Mich. 1981). But
see Jones v. Intermountain Power Project, 794 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1986) (exercising pendent juris-
diction over state law claims); Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance Servs., 711 F.2d 1524 (11th Cir.
1983) (same); Meyer v. California and Hawaiian Sugar Co., 662 F.2d 637 (9th Cir. 1981) (same).
Courts also may refuse to exercise pendent jurisdiction over state law claims that present unsettled
issues of state law. See Grubb v. W.A. Foote Memorial Hosp., Inc., 641 F.2d 1486, 1499-1500 (6th
Cir. 1984). For a thorough discussion of the confusion surrounding the exercise of pendent jurisdic-
tion over state law claims in Title VII suits, see Catania, supra note 160; see also Note, Aldinger v.
Howard, Title VII and Pendent Jurisdiction: Has the Tail Been Cut From the Dog?, 63 U. Dur. L.
REv. 723 (1986).
301. In Jones v. Intermountain Power Project, 794 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1986), the Tenth Cir-
cuit held that the court could exercise pendent jurisdiction over the plaintiff's common-law claims
as well as his Title VII claims. Id. at 552-53. The court's decision, which came well before the
Yellow Freight holding, rested in part on its finding that the federal courts had exclusive jurisdic-
tion over Title VII claims. Because the federal forum was the only forum in which plaintiffs could
present all their claims simultaneously, the court reasoned that it should exercise pendent jurisdic-
tion to prevent a forced bifurcation of claims. Id. at 553. Since the Yellow Freight decision, the
Tenth Circuit's reasoning apparently no longer holds true, thus casting into further doubt the
684
FORUM SELECTION
these courts subject plaintiffs to the risks of issue preclusion by forcing
them to split claims, °2 plaintiffs with strong state claims may choose to
avoid district courts that rarely exercise pendent jurisdiction. Similarly,
plaintiffs with strong federal claims may choose to abandon state claims
over which the federal court refuses to exercise jurisdiction to avoid the
risks of issue preclusion.
In the past, federal procedural rules offered litigants a uniform and
generally litigant-friendly atmosphere in which to proceed. Some of the
procedural advantages of federal court, most notably liberal discovery
and superior class action procedures, may be particularly useful to em-
ployment discrimination plaintiffs. Nevertheless, the federal courts now
appear to be developing and using procedural restrictions as a means of
docket control; thus, plaintiffs must consider this factor in evaluating
the federal forum. If the federal forum is clearly superior in other re-
spects, however, mere procedural inconvenience generally should be in-
sufficient to overcome a preference for the federal forum. Only when a
particular federal procedure presents a distinct risk of negatively affect-
ing outcome should plaintiffs surrender a clear choice of federal forum.
When, however, the federal and state forums appear to provide roughly
equal opportunities for recovery, the potential procedural advantages of
the federal forum may become a deciding factor.303
C. Choosing the Forum: Weighing the Variables
In making a selection between state and federal forums, employ-
ment discrimination litigants must balance the many factors that po-
tentially could affect outcome. Because these factors may vary from
time to time and forum to forum litigants must consider them within
the context of the given case. Thus, this section of the Note provides an
overview of the operation of the balancing process.
First, plaintiffs must compare the breadth of rights and remedies
under state and federal law and determine which, if either, will domi-
nate the desired outcome of the given case. Thus, the plaintiff must
determine whether desired or necessary opportunities and remedies are
available exclusively under state or federal law. Here the plaintiff
should consider the availability of and the need for compensatory and
punitive damages, equitable relief, attorney's fees, and jury trials and
investigate developing trends as well as established principles of state
and federal law.
If, for example, equitable relief such as back pay and reinstatement
pendent jurisdiction issue.
302. See supra note 5.
303. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
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will not compensate the plaintiff adequately, and state claims, either
statutory or common law or both, provide for the recovery of compensa-
tory and perhaps punitive damages, then the plaintiff certainly will
want to present state law claims. In time-consuming and complex cases,
the availability of attorney's fees under Title VII may become a disposi-
tive factor if state law disallows such recovery. If a plaintiff seeks pri-
marily equitable relief, the availability of a jury trial may be less
important than when the litigant seeks monetary damages.
The importance of these factors is dependent on the circumstances
of the particular case, but these examples demonstrate that the relative
value of state and federal law depends primarily on the type of relief
sought and the law under which that relief is available. If recovery is
roughly equal under state and federal law, then the relief factor be-
comes outcome-neutral, and the plaintiff will base forum selection on
the remaining factors alone. If, however, either state or federal law will
dominate the desired outcome of the case, that domination creates a
preference for the forum associated with that law, and remaining fac-
tors either will strengthen or overcome the preference.
Litigants also must compare the competence, receptivity, and bias
of the particular courts and court systems in question. At the local
level, the expertise of both state and federal courts may vary. Neverthe-
less, because of frequent exposure to employment discrimination issues,
the federal courts are likely to possess the requisite expertise. State
courts may have less experience, but increasing exposure to employ-
ment discrimination issues is equalizing the expertise factor in many
states.
Receptivity is a significant factor in both state .and federal forums.
Although political accountability exposes state judges to more
majoritarian pressure, the political climate of a particular community
and the volatility of the issues may heighten or diminish the impact of
political accountability. As a further measure of a court's receptivity,
plaintiffs should look to current trends in judicial expansion of state
law remedies. In contrast, the trend toward a more conservative judici-
ary has made federal courts generally less receptive to employment dis-
crimination claims. Litigants must evaluate the degree to which local
judges are susceptible to that trend. Personal political and judicial phi-
losophy may affect a particular judge's receptivity. The restrictions im-
posed by recent Supreme Court opinions also dictate limits on the
receptivity of all courts to federal claims. Regardless of the claims that
may dominate the case, evaluation of the receptivity factor is particu-
larly important because receptivity potentially could influence the out-
come of any given case. An inordinate level of either receptivity or bias
on the part of a particular court could overcome a forum preference
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based on dominant claims.
Finally, litigants must weigh and balance procedural advantages
and disadvantages that may inhere in each forum. Certainly, if the
availability or unavailability of a certain procedure is likely to affect the
outcome of a given case, procedure may work to overcome even a strong
preference for a particular forum. For example, on the basis of the
claims available and the receptivity of the potential courts, a plaintiff
may find a state forum more attractive; however, because the plaintiff
may be unable to acquire the necessary proof without liberal discovery,
the liberality of the state's discovery rules may determine the choice of
forum.
Perhaps the most important procedural decision facing plaintiffs
who favor state forums is whether and when to surrender federal
claims. Although plaintiffs who have joined federal claims in state court
have the option of dropping federal claims to defeat removal, the time
and expense of this procedure may be wasted if the state law offers the
plaintiff all necessary remedies on an equal or superior basis to federal
law and the available state courts are more dependably receptive. In
this situation, the plaintiff may prefer to sacrifice federal claims from
the outset of litigation, particularly when it appears likely or certain
that the defendant, if given the opportunity, will remove to federal
court. If, however, the state claims and forum offer only a slight advan-
tage, the plaintiff should think carefully about sacrificing any potential
avenue of recovery. When federal claims offer a remedy perhaps un-
available under state law, but a potential federal forum appears partic-
ularly hostile, the plaintiff still might prefer to plead all claims in state
court and then decide whether to abandon federal claims in the event
of removal.
Unlike state court plaintiffs who, through removal, immediately
risk losing their choice of forum when they join state and federal
claims, federal court plaintiffs enjoy more flexibility in pleading. Never-
theless, plaintiffs who favor federal forums also may encounter
problems when they attempt to join state and federal claims, problems
that can endanger the advantages that accompany their forum selec-
tion. If the federal court declines to exercise pendent jurisdiction over
state law claims, the plaintiff who chooses to remain in federal court
has two options. The plaintiff may litigate state and federal claims in
separate forums, thereby running the risks of issue preclusion, or the
plaintiff may abandon state claims to avoid those risks. Thus, federal
court plaintiffs may find themselves in a situation similar to that of
state court plaintiffs, forced to abandon some of their claims to preserve
the advantage of the chosen forum, if not the choice itself.
Litigants, however, should not regard procedural hurdles as auto-
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matically dispositive factors. When mere procedural inconvenience is
unlikely to influence outcome, such inconvenience should not overcome
a strong preference for a particular forum. Only where state and federal
forums are roughly equal in all other respects should a preference for
the basic procedural convenience or familiarity of a particular forum
determine forum selection.
Many factors may operate to make one forum more amenable than
another, and Part IV has suggested several factors that employment
discrimination litigants should consider when selecting a forum. These
factors, however, may vary from case to case, state to state, and time to
time and must be balanced anew in each individual case. Thus, employ-
ment discrimination litigants must arrange these factors in a flexible
framework for application on a case-specific basis in order to use the
forum selection process to their greatest advantage.
V. CONCLUSION
Although, at one time, employment discrimination victims sought
redress in federal courts in almost reflex fashion, today the once clear
choice of federal courts is fading. The Yellow Freight decision rein-
forces the growing role of state courts and state law in employment dis-
crimination litigation. As that role increases, however, so does the
complexity of the forum selection process for litigants.
Debates about the proper role of the state and federal courts in the
protection of federal rights and the adjudication of federal claims focus
broadly upon the proper allocation of judicial resources; the modern
parity debate shares this focus. Because the parity debate seeks to
measure the relative efficacy of the state and federal courts as protec-
tors and enforcers of federal rights at a primary level, it raises many of
the same issues litigants must consider in the forum selection process.
Litigants, however, will consider these issues at a second, more individ-
ualized level. At the second level of parity, litigants can develop a
framework for forum selection that they can apply on a flexible, case-
by-case, forum-by-forum basis.
Because litigants try to predict outcome when selecting a forum,
the process may be inseparable from the realm of intuition. Litigants,
however, can conduct that process within a carefully constructed frame-
work applied on a case-specific basis. By doing so, employment discrim-
ination litigants can do much to inform their intuition and to make,
what perhaps must be a guess, a best guess.
Susan Elizabeth Powley*
* The Author thanks Professor Barry Friedman of the Vanderbilt University School of Law
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